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INNOCENCE AND THE SOPRANOS
SETH D. HARRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Innocence” bears more than one meaning.  “Innocence” can
be defined in a narrow, even technical way: “[f]reedom from spe-
cific guilt; the fact of not being guilty of that which one is charged;
guiltlessness.”1 In this definition, “innocence” describes a positive
state.  But “innocence” can also take on a larger meaning that ex-
tends beyond technicality into morality: “[f]reedom from sin, guilt,
or moral wrong in general; the state of being untainted with, or
unacquainted with, evil; moral purity.”2  This broader definition
conveys a larger idea that is more powerful and evocative than the
former’s narrow literalism.  It is not merely an absence of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt in the style of criminal law’s “not guilty.”
It is not the mere absence of preponderant fault in the style of neg-
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School.  J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1990; B.S., Cornell University School of Industrial & Labor Relations
1983.  This essay had its genesis in classroom discussions of The Sopranos, remedies, and
affirmative action with students in my Employment Discrimination Law classes at New
York Law School.  I benefited immensely from presenting an earlier draft of this essay at
New York Law School’s Faculty Presentation Day and from the comments of my fellow
panelists Robert Blecker and Elizabeth Rosen and members of our Law & Humanities
Panel’s audience, particularly New York Law School students Adam Gana and Michael
Dillon.   I subsequently received thoughtful and valuable comments on earlier drafts
from Thomas Ross and my colleagues David Chang, Arthur Leonard, Carlin Meyer,
Denise Morgan, and David Schoenbrod.  Research assistants Amelia Baker, Amanda
Gaynor, Daniel Gershburg, Greg Rutstein, and Heather Volik made important contri-
butions to this and other projects.  Nonetheless, all errors are mine. I am grateful to
New York Law School for its continuing financial support of my research through its
generous summer grants program. I dedicate this essay to my brother Paul in thanks for
his love and the many ways he has helped me to better understand popular culture.
1. 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 995 (2d ed. 1989) [hereafter OXFORD]; see also
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1166 (3d ed. 1993) [hereafter WEB-
STER’S] (“the state of not being chargeable for or guilty of a particular crime or of-
fense.”).  For a thoughtful discussion of the role of “innocence” in the criminal context,
see William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329 (1995).
2. OXFORD, supra note 1, at 995; see also WEBSTER’S, supra note 1, at 1166 (“Free-
dom from guilt or sin esp. through being unacquainted with evil: purity of heart: blame-
lessness . . .”).
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ligence law’s “not liable.”  It bestows no special legal status. Yet, it is
a positive attribute with normative consequences.
“Innocence,” in this more expansive sense, evokes the sleeping
infant, wholly dependent and pure of thought and deed.  No avoid-
able harm can be justifiably inflicted on this type of “innocent.”3
To the contrary, the infant demands and receives care and protec-
tion from harm.4   Thus, “innocence” in its moral sense is not a
passive state.  It includes the power to command others to action —
that is, to require the care and protection of those deemed
“innocent.”
“Innocence” has played an important role in judicial decisions
addressing claims of workplace discrimination.5 Most litigation in-
volves two parties or, perhaps more accurately, two sides.  One party
claims that a second party has wronged him in some way.  If the
claim is proven, the first party is entitled to relief from his injuries.
Those workplace discrimination cases in which “innocence” has
played an important role have emphasized the importance of third
3. To the contrary, any such harm may produce either legal guilt or legal liabil-
ity. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (2002) (New Jersey’s criminal law prohibiting child
abuse).  Since the Sopranos live and “work” in New Jersey, this essay will assume that
New Jersey and federal law are most relevant to the Sopranos and, therefore, this essay.
4. “Innocence” may suggest cultural references other than the sleeping infant
proposed here. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and
Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 34-37 (1990) (contrasting the “innocent” as
a virginal antithesis of the “sexual defiler”) [hereinafter Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry];
Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 308-10 (1990)
(same, but also emphasizing that women and children are cultural reference points for
“innocence”) [hereinafter Ross, Innocence]; or even allegories that rely upon different
images. See, e.g.,  Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil
Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1006-10 (1989). Nonetheless, these alterna-
tive images of “innocence” do not alter the basic point that the “innocent” is perceived
to be entitled to protection from harm which, in turn, gives the “innocent” power over
others.
5. The role of “innocence” in discrimination cases, particularly affirmative action
cases, has been the subject of substantial scholarly comment. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68
TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989) [hereinafter Ross, Richmond Narratives]; Ross, Rhetorical Tapes-
try, supra note 4; Ross, Innocence, supra note 4; Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44
VAND. L. REV. 15 (1991); David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Inno-
cent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991);
Ansley, supra note 4; John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analy-
sis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313 (1994).
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parties who are neither the actor in the drama nor the acted upon.
While these third parties may be relevant to determinations regard-
ing appropriate remedies, the Supreme Court has wielded the
power of “innocence” to give these third parties a decisive role in
determining whether and how the injuries caused by discrimination
will be remedied.
From the Supreme Court’s perspective, the relevant third par-
ties in workplace discrimination cases are the white and male co-
workers of the African-American and women workers who have
been the victims of discrimination.  The African-American and
women workers who seek remedies for the injuries resulting from
race and sex discrimination want to change an unjust status quo.
They seek promotions or job opportunities or raises they would
have received absent discrimination. Their white and male co-work-
ers may prefer to preserve the status quo because they, in some
number of cases, have received the promotions, job opportunities,
and raises that should have gone to the African-American and
women workers; that is, they have received the proceeds of discrimi-
nation and would like to keep them.  The question for the Supreme
Court, therefore, has been whether the proceeds of discrimination
must be returned to the victims of discrimination or if their “inno-
cent” co-workers should be permitted to keep them.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on the “innocence”
of white and male workers to preserve the status quo and deprive
African-American and female discrimination victims of complete re-
lief from discrimination.  By wrapping workers who have not suf-
fered discrimination in the cloak of “innocence,” the Court has
effectively declared the victims of discrimination and their co-work-
ers to be morally equivalent.6 As a result, the victims of discrimina-
tion do not, when compared with their “innocent” co-workers, own
a superior claim to the care and protection of the law.  Ill-gotten
6. See Devins, supra note 5, at 20 (describing the view of affirmative action oppo-
nents that “minorities and whites are always alike”); Ross, Richmond Narratives, supra
note 5, at 397-98 (discussing moral equivalence as “symmetry”). Cf. Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I believe that
there is a ‘moral and constitutional equivalence,’ between laws designed to subjugate a
race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some
current notion of equality.  Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize,
respect, and protect us as equal before the law.”) (internal citation omitted).
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proceeds from discrimination need not be returned to the victims
of discrimination.  The discriminatory status quo can be preserved.
This essay will argue that the Supreme Court’s “innocence” ju-
risprudence, at least in the workplace discrimination cases,
amounts to nothing more than a subtle bait-and-switch of one defi-
nition of “innocence” for the other.  The white and male co-work-
ers of the victims of discrimination are “innocents” only in the sense
that they satisfy the narrow definition: “freedom from specific guilt”
or, in the words of one Supreme Court justice, “not the wrongdo-
ers.”7  Even though these workers satisfy only the narrow definition
of “innocence,” however, the Supreme Court has afforded them al-
most parental care and protection appropriate only for the sleeping
infant who exemplifies the broader, moral definition of “inno-
cence.”  Further, by casting their co-workers as “innocents,” the Su-
preme Court re-casts the victims of discrimination in the role of
perpetrators — in this metaphor, baby-bottle thieves or, worse,
child abusers — who would harm “innocents.”  In this morality
play, a neutral and beneficent judiciary restrains the perpetrators
and thereby fulfills its obligation to care for and protect the “inno-
cent.”8 “Innocence” thereby alchemizes cases about discrimination
against disadvantaged groups into narratives in which African-
Americans and women seek to deprive white and male workers of
their rightful interests.9 In this way, the debate over workplace dis-
crimination minimizes discrimination and its victims, while empha-
sizing the purported plight of “innocent” co-workers.10
7. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell’s defi-
nition of “innocence” in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)).
8. See Ross, Innocence, supra note 4, at 301 (describing the dialectical nature of
“innocence”); see also Ross, Richmond Narratives, supra note 5, at 398, 401-03 (discussing
how “innocence” evokes images of African-Americans oppressing whites).
9. In a private memorandum to his brother justices discussing Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), Justice Brennan expressed his deep frustration
with the false characterizations of the victims of discrimination as perpetrators and their
white co-workers as “innocents.”  The memorandum argued Brennan’s view that the
victims of discrimination were undeniably as “innocent” as their co-workers. See Mark
V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991: The View from the Mar-
shall Papers, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 538-39 (1995).
10. See Ross, Innocence, supra note 4, at 301 (“[T]he rhetoric of innocence avoids
the argument that white people generally have benefited from the oppression of people
of color, that white people have been advantaged by this oppression in a myriad of
obvious and less obvious ways.”); see also Ansley, supra note 4, at 1013-22 (arguing that
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Beyond re-shaping the debate over discrimination and giving
white and male workers protection which their limited claim to “in-
nocence” does not justify, this misuse of the power of “innocence”
has deprived the victims of discrimination of the complete justice
they deserve.  With the introduction of “innocence” into the cases,
the question was no longer how the workplace manifestations of
racism or sexism should be ameliorated or even eliminated, but
how to divide a small and fixed pie among morally equivalent work-
ers. The central issue became how best to resolve a struggle be-
tween the victims of discrimination and their co-workers over jobs,
promotions, and wages.11 The Court’s answer has been to constrain
the lower courts and other branches and levels of government from
preferring the victims of discrimination over their “innocent” co-
workers in the assignment of burdens and benefits in the work-
place.  The Court’s use of “innocence” to re-frame the question dic-
tated this answer — the wrong answer to the question of how to
remedy discrimination in the American workplace.
The purported moral equivalence of the victims of discrimina-
tion and their “innocent” co-workers is one residue of a willful mis-
reading of Brown v. Board of Education’s legacy.12  Of course, Brown
mandated formal, legal equality in the public schools; that is, gov-
ernment could not segregate public-school students on the basis of
race.13 Brown’s mis-interpreters treat formal equality as indistin-
guishable from social and economic equality.14  After Brown, and
the rhetoric in the Supreme Court’s race cases has shifted focus from public purposes
to private conflict).
11. See Ansley, supra note 4, at 1014-19.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Thomas Ross made a troubling but convincing argu-
ment that the rhetoric of “white innocence” which pervades the modern Supreme
Court’s race-related decisions essentially echoes similar rhetorical devices employed in
the most widely derided Supreme Court decisions relating to race, like the Dred Scott
decision, the Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy v. Ferguson, as well as in the arguments of the
pro-segregation forces in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Ross, Rhetori-
cal Tapestry, supra note 4, at 7.
13. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
14. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1750-
57 (1993) (discussing Brown’s legacy); Ansley, supra note 4, at 999-1001 (same); see also
Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 4, at 24-25 (arguing that the Brown Court’s failure to
confront the pro-segregationists’ “white innocence” argument had lasting conse-
quences).  For a comprehensive discussion of the “color-blindness” argument that
serves as the rhetorical leading edge of this failure to distinguish formal from socio-
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perhaps the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the mis-interpreters offer a
seductive syllogism: all Americans are equal under law, therefore,
all Americans are equally entitled to the law’s care and protec-
tion.15  Yet, Brown was a beginning, not an end. Brown prohibited
de jure segregation, but did not ratify the de facto inequality that re-
mained after school desegregation.  Equality under the law did not
assure social or economic equality.  Equality under the law also did
not require the government to ignore social or economic inequality
whenever “innocence” might be invoked.  But the Supreme Court
has repeatedly chosen to tacitly ratify the social and economic ine-
quality produced by discrimination by leaving it unremedied.  In-
voking “innocence” has provided the Court with rhetorical cover
for its policy choice.
This essay will argue that the Supreme Court’s misuse of “inno-
cence” in the workplace discrimination cases has led to unjust re-
sults inconsistent with the equal opportunity goal codified in our
nation’s employment discrimination statutes and implied in our
Constitution.  It will begin by disclosing how the Supreme Court
has wielded the power of “innocence” in its workplace discrimina-
tion cases.  But this essay will also respond to the Supreme Court’s
subtle bait-and-switch of one form of “innocence” for another with
a resounding “fuhgeddaboutit!”  It recruits America’s favorite TV
mob family — the Sopranos — to help in the assessment of what it
means to be “innocent.”  Fictional New Jersey crime boss Tony So-
prano, his wife Carmela, his oldest child Meadow, and only son
Anthony, Jr. (“AJ”) challenge the role that “innocence” plays in the
resolution of disputes over workplace discrimination and help us to
economic equality, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
15. For good measure, they may even enlist an out-of-context quotation from Dr.
Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech: “I have a dream that my four little
children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their
skin, but by the content of their character.”  Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream
(Aug. 28, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 218 (James M. Washington ed., 1986).  Another oft-invoked
quotation misinterpreted to support this claim to equality in all respects comes from
Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: “Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens . . . The law regards man
as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color. . . .”  Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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understand that “innocence,” as defined in the only manner appro-
priate to the white and male co-workers of the victims of discrimina-
tion, is and should be irrelevant to the resolution of these disputes.
In the process, the Sopranos offer a competing vision of what it
means to genuinely and fully remedy workplace discrimination.  It’s
an offer we can’t refuse.16
II. THE POWER OF “INNOCENCE” IN THE WORKPLACE
Although child labor laws prohibit introducing infants into the
workplace,17 the Supreme Court has found an abundance of “in-
nocents” in the American workforce.  This section will describe the
prominent roles these “innocents” have played in the Supreme
Court’s decisions in three lines of discrimination cases. First, in
cases where an employer has been held liable for workplace dis-
crimination, the Supreme Court circumscribes the remedies availa-
ble to the victims of workplace discrimination when certain
remedies might threaten the interests of their “innocent” co-work-
ers.  Second, in cases where a governmental body has sought to
remedy societal discrimination through affirmative action, the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the Constitution to  strictly limit the
use of affirmative action purportedly to protect  “innocent” people
from harm.  Third, in cases where an employer has voluntarily un-
dertaken affirmative action, the Supreme Court has interpreted Ti-
tle VII to require courts to consider and protect the interests of
“innocent” co-workers when assessing the validity of an affirmative
action plan.  These three lines of discrimination cases, which first
developed in the 1970s and 1980s but largely survive today, give
evidence of the power of “innocence.”18
16. Admittedly, I am mixing iconic and fictional Mafia patriarchs here.  In The
Godfather, Vito Corleone assured his crooner godson Johnny Fontane that a movie pro-
ducer would cast the godson in an upcoming movie because the Godfather would
“make him an offer he can’t refuse.” See J. Geoff Malta, The Godfather Trilogy: The Unoffi-
cial Site, at http://www.jgeoff.com/godfather.html (last visited May 26, 2004).
17. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2000) (the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
18. See generally Ansley, supra note 4, at 1013-22 (arguing that the Court began
paying heed to “innocent” workers only in the 1970s and 1980s after a substantial body
of constitutional jurisprudence paid little attention to the effects of anti-discrimination
law on purported “innocents”).
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A. Remedies Cases
1. Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Justice Lewis Powell’s partly concurring, partly dissenting opin-
ion in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company19 introduced “inno-
cence” into the debate over what constitutes an appropriate remedy
for workplace discrimination.  Bowman Transportation discrimi-
nated against classes of African-American job applicants and trans-
fer-seeking incumbents.  Both groups were denied jobs as over-the-
road truck drivers.  The question before the Supreme Court was
whether the district court should have granted the successful plain-
tiffs’ proposed remedy of retroactive seniority in addition to the
other remedies it found appropriate.
Seniority loomed large at Bowman Transportation.  Layoffs
and recalls of employees, as well as job assignments and, therefore,
earnings, were determined according to seniority.  Seniority also
determined the length of employees’ vacations and the size of their
pension benefits.20  Thus, the Supreme Court held that Title VII’s
mandate to provide “make whole” relief required the district court
to order retroactive seniority for the African-American victims of
Bowman Transportation’s discrimination.  But the Court stopped
short of ordering the “complete relief” that would have come from
stripping seniority from the white workers whose jobs would have
gone to African-Americans absent the employer’s discriminatory
hiring practices:
[E]ven if the seniority relief . . . is awarded, most if not all
[discrimination victims] will not truly be restored to the
actual seniority that would have existed in the absence of
the illegal discrimination. Rather, [they] will still remain
subordinated in the hierarchy to a position inferior to
that of a greater total number of employees than would
have been the case in the absence of discrimination.21
Even though its decision perpetuated an ill effect of discrimination,
the Court’s majority refused to deprive white workers of the senior-
ity they accrued as a result of Bowman Transportation’s discrimina-
19. 424 U.S. 747, 780 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
20. See id. at 767.
21. Id. at 776.
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tory hiring practices.  For Justice Powell, however, even this
incomplete relief was too generous to the victims of Bowman Trans-
portation’s discrimination.
The law of remedies explains why the Franks Court’s majority
approved incomplete relief for the victims of Bowman Transporta-
tion’s discrimination and why Justice Powell disapproved.  Reme-
dies law holds that judicial grants of injunctive relief should
generally aim to put the plaintiff in his rightful position — that is,
to grant complete relief.22  In employment discrimination cases, the
plaintiff’s rightful position would be the workplace outcome that
would have resulted absent the employer’s discriminatory act.23
Yet, this general goal is subject to judges’ exercise of equitable dis-
cretion to grant injunctions which put the plaintiff in a less-than-
rightful position through a process called “balancing the equities.”
Balancing the equities involves weighing the benefits of putting the
plaintiff in his rightful position against the costs. If the costs sub-
stantially outweigh the benefits, the judge may be justified in order-
ing an injunction which puts the plaintiff in something less than his
rightful position.24
When shaping remedies for statutory violations, however,
courts’ discretion is constrained by the statute’s purposes.25  The
equities must be balanced in a manner consistent with the statute’s
22. See DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 38 (2002) (“An
injunction’s primary mission must be to protect the plaintiff’s rightful position.  This
phrase encompasses preventing future wrongdoing and, if the wrong has already oc-
curred, repairing the harm done to the plaintiff.”).
23. See generally Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-
86 (1977) (discussing how to assess a plaintiff’s rightful position).
24. See David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace
Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 633 (1988).  Other
factors may also be relevant to the court’s decision, such as the comparative fault of the
parties. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 22, at 97.
25. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982); Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330-31
(1944).  Even outside the statutory context, balancing the equities must take into ac-
count the goals of the underlying law.  For this reason, there is a danger in generalizing
from equities balances struck in cases involving claims of nuisance, for example, since
“[e]fficiency and fairness are . . . the chief concerns of the law of nuisance.” SCHOEN-
BROD, supra note 22, at 105-06 (discussing Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (1927)
and Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219 (1970)).  Judges assessing remedies
for violations of other laws which do not have efficiency and “fairness” as their preemi-
nent goals must strike different balances in service of different goals.
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goals and means, and courts should add into the balance only those
factors which the legislature did not consider.26  The debate be-
tween the Franks majority and Justice Powell, therefore, properly
addressed how Congress intended for courts to address appeals for
retroactive seniority.  The debate began with agreement on two ba-
sic points.  First, Title VII gives courts the authority to order retroac-
tive seniority.27  Second, Title VII preserves some equitable
discretion for courts when deciding about awards of retroactive se-
niority.28  The Franks majority and Justice Powell disagreed, how-
ever, about what weight should be assigned to various factors in
courts’ equities balancing.  This disagreement, and Justice Powell’s
position in particular, disclose the power of “innocence.”
In the majority’s view, Congress intended that Title VII pro-
hibit “all practices in whatever form which create inequality in em-
ployment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, sex, or national origin, and ordained that its policy of out-
lawing such discrimination should have the ‘highest priority.’”29 In
order to effect this goal, Congress intended that courts make the
victims of discrimination whole.30 The majority acknowledged that
Title VII specifically preserved courts’ equitable discretion to shape
remedies, but interpreted Congress’ preservation of courts’ discre-
tion as a means to the statute’s desired end — that is:
[To] fashion the most complete relief possible. . . . [T]he
Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination whole, and . . . the attainment of this
objective . . . requires that persons aggrieved by the conse-
quences and effects of the unlawful employment practice
be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they
26. See Schoenbrod, supra note 24, at 647.
27. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1976); see also id. at
781-82 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
28. Id. at 764-66, 781-82.
29. Id. at 763 (citations omitted); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 202-04 (1979) (Title VII’s purpose is to effect equal employment opportu-
nity); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1987) (Title VII’s
purpose, and the purpose of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act which amended Title
VII, is to effect “equal employment opportunity”).
30. Franks, 424 U.S. at 763; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975) (“It is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suf-
fered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”).
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would have been were it not for the unlawful
discrimination.31
The majority also cited legislative history demonstrating that
Congress intended for courts to include retroactive seniority in
make-whole remedies.32  The majority explained that awarding ret-
roactive seniority would effect make-whole relief for the victims of
discrimination while also serving Title VII’s goal of preventing fur-
ther discrimination:
Without an award of seniority dating from the time when
he was discriminatorily refused employment, an individ-
ual who applies for and obtains employment as an [over-
the-road] driver pursuant to the District Court’s order will
never obtain his rightful place in the hierarchy of senior-
ity according to which these various employment benefits
are distributed. He will perpetually remain subordinate to
persons who, but for the illegal discrimination, would
have been in respect to entitlement to these benefits his
inferiors.33
In other words, in the absence of a retroactive seniority award, the
employer’s future decisions would necessarily be affected, if not dic-
tated, by the employer’s discriminatory hiring practices.
In sum, the majority’s view was that Congress intended courts
to award retroactive seniority to the victims of discrimination unless
denying seniority would not frustrate the central statutory purposes
of eradicating discrimination and making persons whole for inju-
31. Franks, 424 U.S. at 764 (quoting Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, ac-
companying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 Conference Report, 118
Cong. Rec. 7166, 7168 (1972)); see also id. at 770-71 (“Discretion is vested not for pur-
poses of ‘limit[ing] appellate review of trial courts, or . . . invit[ing] inconsistency and
caprice,’ but rather to allow the most complete achievement of the objectives of Title
VII that is attainable under the facts and circumstances of the specific case.”) (quoting
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421) (alterations in original).
32. Id. at 764 n.21.
33. Id. at 767-68; see also id. at 768 n.28 (“[T]he issue of seniority relief cuts to the
very heart of Title VII’s primary objective of eradicating present and future discrimina-
tion in a way that backpay, for example, can never do. ‘[S]eniority, after all, is a right
which a worker exercises in each job movement in the future, rather than a simple one-
time payment for the past.’ Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff
Problem, 23 UCLA L. REV. 177, 225 (1975).”).
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ries suffered due to past discrimination.34  Applying this under-
standing of Title VII’s purposes, the majority balanced the equities
in favor of retroactive seniority generally and for the African-Ameri-
can victims of Bowman’s discrimination in particular.  Yet, the ma-
jority permitted Bowman’s white employees to keep the seniority
they earned in jobs they would not have obtained absent that dis-
crimination.  In the majority’s view:
The burden of the past discrimination in hiring is with
respect to competitive status benefits divided among dis-
criminatee and nondiscriminatee employees under the
form of relief sought. . . . We are of the view . . . that the
result which we reach today — which, standing alone, es-
tablishes that a sharing of the burden of the past discrimi-
nation is presumptively necessary — is entirely consistent
with any fair characterization of equity jurisdiction. . . .35
Justice Powell concluded that the Franks majority’s opinion re-
quired courts to balance the equities too favorably to the victims of
discrimination.  Powell based his argument on a difference he
found between “benefit-type seniority” and “competitive-type se-
niority.”  Benefit-type seniority decides certain economic questions
between the employer and the employee: vacation pay, pension
vesting and value, and the availability and amount of insurance cov-
erage and unemployment benefits, for example.36  Workers earn
greater benefits through longer tenure.  Competitive-type seniority,
on the other hand, decides certain questions between employees
and their co-workers, such as layoffs, recalls, job and trip assign-
ments, and promotions.37  As a general matter, workers are less sus-
ceptible to bad outcomes (e.g., layoff, undesirable assignments or
relocations) and better situated for good outcomes (e.g., promo-
tions) as their tenure increases.38
Powell offered no complaint regarding an award of benefit-
type seniority to the victims of Bowman Transportation’s discrimi-
nation: “Benefit-type seniority, like backpay, serves to work com-
34. Franks, 424 U.S. at 771.
35. Id. at 777.
36. See id. at 786-87 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
37. Id. at 787.
38. Id.
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plete equity by penalizing the wrongdoer economically at the same
time that it tends to make whole the one who was wronged.”39  But
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
balked at awarding competitive-type seniority to the discrimination
victims:
Competitive seniority benefits, as the term implies, di-
rectly implicate the rights and expectations of perfectly in-
nocent employees.  The economic benefits awarded
discrimination victims would be derived not at the ex-
pense of the employer but at the expense of other work-
ers.  Putting it differently, those disadvantaged —
sometimes to the extent of losing their jobs entirely — are
not the wrongdoers who have no claim to the Chancel-
lor’s conscience, but rather are innocent third parties.40
Thus, Justice Powell’s “perfectly innocent employees” should not
merely retain their seniority, as the majority allowed, even though
their seniority was made possible by the employer’s discriminatory
refusal to hire African-Americans for over-the-road truck-driving po-
sitions.  In Justice Powell’s view, a court could properly (and proba-
bly should) exercise its discretion to allow these “innocent” white
workers to retain superior seniority with respect to layoffs, recalls,
promotions, assignments, and perhaps earnings.  In sum, “in-
nocents” could, perhaps should, be permitted to keep their place in
line ahead of the victims of discrimination.
Justice Powell readily conceded that “[i]t is true, of course, that
the retroactive grant of competitive-type seniority does go a step
further in ‘making whole’ the discrimination victim, and therefore
arguably furthers one of the objectives of Title VII.”41  Nonetheless,
Powell pressed his argument that the remedies issues in Franks pit-
ted the victims of discrimination against their co-workers.  In partic-
ular, Powell disagreed with the majority regarding whether
retroactive competitive-type seniority would protect against future
acts of discrimination: “a retroactive grant of competitive-type se-
niority usually does not directly affect the employer at all.  It causes
39. Id.
40. Franks, 424 U.S. at 788-89 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 787.
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only a rearrangement of employees along the seniority ladder with-
out any resulting increase in cost.”42  Thus, according to Powell,
retroactive seniority for the victims of discrimination harmed only
their “innocent” co-workers without effecting greater compliance
with Title VII.
Powell was plainly correct that awards of retroactive competi-
tive-type seniority “usually” would not directly affect an employer.
But Powell overstepped when he declared that “Title VII’s ‘primary
objective’ of eradicating discrimination is not served at all. . . .”43
Bowman Transportation was not entirely disinterested in awards of
retroactive competitive-type seniority.  In particular, Bowman
Transportation had a strong interest in its workers’ productivity
and, therefore, any effects an award of retroactive seniority might
have on productivity.  For example, Bowman Transportation cer-
tainly would have been concerned if awards of retroactive competi-
tive-type seniority prevented it from using promotions or transfers
to match white workers with jobs in which their productivity would
increase.44  Bowman Transportation also would have been affected
by any decline in morale among its white workers resulting from
their loss of comparative advantage over the victims of discrimina-
tion, particularly if these “innocent” workers quit or shirked in their
jobs.45  Given the opportunity, Bowman Transportation and other
employers would want to avoid these negative effects; therefore,
awards of retroactive competitive-type seniority very well might de-
ter future discriminatory decisions.
Nonetheless, after mistakenly describing retroactive competi-
tive-type seniority awards as nothing more than a zero-sum game
between the victims of discrimination and their “innocent” co-work-
ers, Powell turned to two provisions of Title VII in search of support
for his position.  While not directly applicable to Franks, Powell ar-
gued that these provisions gave evidence of Congress’ intent to al-
low courts to exercise their discretion to protect “innocent”
42. Id. at 787-88.
43. Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
44. For a discussion of “job match” theory that posits this productivity effect, see
Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: US Airways v. Barnett, the
ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123, 158 (2003).
45. For a discussion of the potential relationship between morale, quits, and shirk-
ing, see id. at 157-64.
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workers.  Instead, Powell’s arguments disclosed the important role
“innocence” played in his analysis.
Powell conceded that section 703(h) established only a defense
from liability for employers maintaining “bona fide seniority sys-
tem[s]” that “perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination.”46
The plainest reading of section 703(h) would hold that Congress
intended nothing more than to insulate pre-Act discrimination
from liability by applying Title VII only prospectively.  Nonetheless,
Powell asserted that section 703(h) must have evidenced a congres-
sional intent that courts should protect seniority rights earned by
“innocent” workers.
Powell’s reading of section 703(h) disclosed his willingness to
wield the power of “innocence” on behalf of Bowman Transporta-
tion’s white workers.  Even if Powell’s interpretation found support
in Title VII’s legislative history, as Powell claimed,47 he offered no
argument as to why his interpretation suggested that Congress in-
tended his preferred equities balancing to the majority’s view that
Congress favored retroactive seniority.  The majority’s opinion pre-
served seniority rights.  Specifically, it preserved the white workers’
seniority within Bowman’s seniority system and left that system in
place.48  The only change wrought by the majority was to deprive
the “innocent” workers of a seniority advantage made possible by
discriminatory acts.  Powell viewed this seniority advantage differ-
ently.  The “innocent” white workers earned their advantage, Pow-
ell suggested, as though Bowman Transportation’s discrimination
had never occurred.49  Powell treated the “innocent” workers and
the victims of discrimination as wholly equivalent.  Because they
46. Franks, 424 U.S. at 781 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Section 703(h) reads, in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this
title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system. . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
47. The Franks majority disagreed with this characterization of the legislative his-
tory:  There is no indication in the legislative materials that § 703(h) was intended to
modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory practice
occurring after the effective date of the Act is proved. . . .” Franks, 424 U.S. at 761-62.
48. For a general discussion of the role seniority plays in the internal labor mar-
ket, see Harris, supra note 44, at 156-59; see also Seth D. Harris, Coase’s Paradox and the
Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1250-52 (2002).
49. See Franks, 424 U.S. at 790 & 788 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
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were equivalent and equivalent parties must be treated the same,
granting retroactive competitive-type seniority would have deprived
“innocent” workers of a well-deserved benefit, while providing the
victims of discrimination with an unearned windfall.
Powell’s reliance on section 703(j) further illustrates the im-
portance of “innocence” to his Franks opinion.  Section 703(j)
holds that employers cannot be required “to grant preferential
treatment to any individual . . . because of the race . . . of such
individual . . . on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race. . .
employed by any employer . . . in comparison with the total number
or percentage of persons of such race . . . in [the surrounding
area].”50  Powell conceded that the precise form of preferential
treatment addressed in section 703(j) was not at issue in Franks.51
Nonetheless, in Powell’s view, retroactive competitive-type seniority
for the victims of discrimination would be a form of “preferential
treatment” and, therefore, disfavored by Congress: “It constitutes a
preference in the sense that the victim of discrimination hence-
forth will outrank, in the seniority system, the incumbents hired af-
ter the discrimination . . . The incumbents, who in fact were on the
job during the interim and performing satisfactorily, would be seri-
ously disadvantaged.”52
Powell’s re-casting of the seniority remedy as an unfair and un-
warranted “preference” does not withstand even mild scrutiny.  Any
“preference” resulting from a remedial award of retroactive com-
petitive-type seniority would not have been “because of the race . . .
of such individual,”53 as Congress specifically provided in section
703(j).  Rather, the “preference” would have arisen because one
group had suffered discrimination while the other — Powell’s “in-
nocents” — had not.54   But more important, there was no prefer-
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000).
51. Franks, 424 U.S. at 792-93 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
52. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000).
54. See Chang, supra note 5, at 810-12; see also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1984) (only a victim of illegal discrimination is entitled to a
remedy); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371-376 (1977) (“A
nonapplicant must show that he was a potential victim of unlawful discrimination [in
order to receive a remedy].”); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982)
(“[W]e should be wary of any rule that encourages job offers that compel innocent
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ence.  “Preference” implies treating like cases differently.  Again,
the victims of discrimination and their “innocent” co-workers were
alike only if viewed through a prism that reduces discrimination to
insignificance.  The victims of Bowman Transportation’s discrimi-
nation would receive retroactive seniority because they were the vic-
tims of discrimination, unlike their white co-workers.  The only way
to reach the conclusion that discrimination victims and their co-
workers must be treated the same — that is, must receive the same
care and protection from the law — was to view the two groups as
morally equivalent.  For Powell, this was the meaning of “inno-
cence.”  Because they were morally equivalent to the proven victims
of discrimination, the “innocent” white workers were entitled to de-
mand and receive the law’s protection from losing their place in
the seniority queue.
Powell’s false equation of the victims of discrimination with
their “innocent” co-workers becomes even clearer after factoring in
one of the most important background principles of workplace law.
In the absence of a contract, collective bargaining agreement, or
specific statutory protection, workers do not have an enforceable
interest in their expectations of continued employment, a specific
wage, or a particular place in a seniority order.  This legal principle,
which was the default rule governing the employment relationship
between Bowman Transportation and its white workers, is com-
monly known as the “employment at-will” doctrine.  This doctrine
famously offers no protection to workers’ expectations in these cir-
cumstances and almost all others.55
Taken together with the employment at-will doctrine, Justice
Powell’s “innocence”-inspired position in Franks would have re-
sulted in two anomalies.  First, Powell would have given effect to the
seniority-based expectations of Bowman Transportation’s “inno-
cent” white workers against the victims of Bowman Transportation’s
discrimination; however, these “innocent” workers’ expectations
would not be given any effect against Bowman Transportation  be-
cause of the employment at-will doctrine.  Second, neither Powell
workers to sacrifice their seniority to a person who has only claimed, but not yet proved,
unlawful discrimination.”).
55. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Di-
vine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000) (discussing the employment
at-will doctrine).
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nor the employment at-will doctrine would give any effect to the
expectations of Bowman Transportation’s African-American job
and transfer applicants against anyone.  Instead, Powell’s invocation
of “innocence” pits white worker against African-American worker
and casts the employer-discriminator as a disinterested bystander.56
It is a single-edged sword permitted to cut in only one direction.
2. After Franks
The muscular form of “innocence’s” power flexed in Justice
Powell’s Franks opinion weakened slightly as Powell’s view evolved
into the majority’s rule in subsequent Supreme Court remedies de-
cisions under Title VII and beyond.  But Justice Powell’s view of
how courts should balance the equities between the victims of dis-
crimination and their “innocent” co-workers plainly prevailed in
subsequent cases.  In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,57 the
Court proclaimed that “[a]s part of this Nation’s dedication to
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called
upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.”58  The question
thereafter became, how much is “some”?  The Court answered that
question by distinguishing between three categories of remedies for
discrimination.59  The categories themselves illustrate the great
weight given to “innocence” in the Court’s balancing of equities in
workplace discrimination cases.  The categories were not deline-
ated based on how well the remedies served Title VII’s purposes,
56. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest,
and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 840 (2003) (discussing how
pitting white workers against African-American workers “treats advancement within the
working class as a zero-sum game in which redistribution is only possible among work-
ing class people, not between them and other classes”); Ansley, supra note 4, at 1055
(proposing a class-focused model which acknowledges that the white worker may have
been victimized, but that the African-American worker is not the victimizer); see also
Harris, supra note 14, at 1741-43 (discussing the history of racial exclusion and how it
served “to stifle class tensions among whites.  White workers perceived that they had
more in common with the bourgeoisie than with fellow workers who were Black.”).
57. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
58. Id. at 280-81.
59. The Court also answered the question in some later cases by deemphasizing
the importance of assuring make-whole relief to the victims of discrimination. See, e.g.,
Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 230 (“Title VII’s primary goal, of course, is to end discrimina-
tion; the victims of job discrimination want jobs, not lawsuits.  But when unlawful dis-
crimination does occur, Title VII’s secondary, fallback purpose is to compensate the
victims for their injuries.”).
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particularly its overriding purpose of achieving equal employment
opportunity through the provision of make-whole relief.  Rather,
the Court drew its lines based on the remedies’ effects on “inno-
cent” co-workers.
The first category consists of remedies that would open job op-
portunities for the victims of discrimination by effectively limiting
the number of white (or male) workers that a particular employer
could hire.  These “hiring” remedies generally have not troubled
the Court’s defenders of “innocence”:  “In cases involving valid hir-
ing goals, the burden to be borne by innocent individuals is dif-
fused to a considerable extent among society generally.”60  Labor
economists would explain this conclusion by observing that the “ex-
ternal labor market” (i.e., where workers seek jobs from employers
who do not yet employ them) consists of large numbers of workers
with generally fungible skills offering themselves for employment to
a large number of employers making essentially fungible job offers.
Since neither the workers nor the employers in the external labor
market have made any significant investment in an employment re-
lationship (e.g., by sinking costs into skills and knowledge acquisi-
tion), there are very few or no transaction costs associated with an
employer choosing one worker over another, or a worker choosing
one employer over another.  Thus, a worker will not be better off
making a deal with Employer A than with Employer B.  Similarly, an
employer will not be better off making a deal with Worker A or with
Worker B.61
As a result, even a remedy which made it impossible for one
employer to hire any white male workers — the extreme hypotheti-
cal case of a 100% remedial hiring goal — would have only a de
minimis effect on the excluded workers’ job prospects.  These ex-
cluded white workers could, at low cost, find another employer in
the external labor market.  Hence, the Supreme Court has grudg-
ingly concluded that allowing a remedy with this de minimis effect
on “innocent” workers does not unbalance the equities associated
with remedying workplace discrimination.
60. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986).
61. See Harris, supra note 48, at 1203 (discussing the operation of the external
labor market).
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The second category, “layoff remedies,” occupies the other end
of the spectrum of consequences for “innocents.”  Remedies that
would effectively require an employer to lay off additional white (or
male) workers in order to protect victims of discrimination from
losing their jobs have been effectively prohibited by the Court:
“While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only
one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in
serious disruption of their lives.  That burden is too intrusive.”62
The labor economics explanation for this conclusion would be that
incumbent employees invest heavily in a continuing relationship
with their employer and expect dividends from that investment, in-
cluding not only continued employment, but also wages that rise
until retirement.  Layoffs deprive employees of some or all of those
expected dividends.63
Rather than depriving their co-workers of expected dividends
with a layoff remedy, the Court has essentially concluded that the
victims of discrimination must bear the consequences of
discrimination:
Even when an individual shows that the discriminatory
practice has had an impact on him, he is not automati-
cally entitled to have a nonminority employee laid off to
make room for him.  He may have to wait until a vacancy
occurs, and if there are nonminority employees on layoff,
the court must balance the equities in determining who is
entitled to the job.64
62. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283.  Of course, Wygant decided a claim based on the 14th
Amendment rather than Title VII; however, its discussion of layoff remedies relied al-
most entirely on Title VII cases.  See id. at 282-84 (citing and discussing Franks and
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984)).
63. See Harris, supra note 44, at 180 (2003) (discussing the operation of the inter-
nal labor market); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (discussing how layoffs become highly
burdensome and intrusive for employees).
64. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984) (citations
omitted).  Without ever being expressly invoked, “innocence” played a similar part in a
recent Supreme Court decision interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), the Court considered whether an
employer would be required to provide a workplace accommodation proposed by an
employee with a disability which violated the employer’s seniority system.  The Court
held that such an accommodation would “ordinarily” not be “reasonable” and, there-
fore, not mandated by the ADA. Id. at 394.  “[A] demand for an effective accommoda-
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In essence, the Court’s balancing of the equities takes as its premise
that equivalently situated workers should be subjected to equivalent
effects.  The Court will permit a hiring remedy because its de
minimis effects on “innocent” workers approximate the position oc-
cupied by the victims of discrimination who have been forced by
discrimination to wait for a job they will eventually get.  But the
Court will not authorize a layoff that deprives co-workers of their
expected dividends because this result represents an unfair shifting
of the consequences of discrimination from the victims of discrimi-
nation to their “innocent” co-workers.  Instead, the victims of dis-
crimination must wait to be recalled to their jobs and, if a recall
happens, compete on an even playing field with their “innocent”
co-workers.
The unavailability of a layoff remedy perpetuates the costs
which discrimination imposes on its victims.  In the first instance,
they are deprived of the pay, benefits, and self-respect that attend a
return to work.  In the longer term, they are deprived of the skills,
knowledge, and relationship-building opportunities — the invest-
ments that yield dividends in the long term — that play an impor-
tant role in further advancement in many workplaces.65  Thus, even
if the victims of discrimination eventually secure employment, they
suffer losses which cannot be recouped.  Opportunities for equal
employment are lost.  The victims are not made whole.
The third category of remedies involves promotions.  Promo-
tions-related remedies occupy a middle ground between hiring
tion,” wrote Justice Breyer for the Court’s plurality, “could prove unreasonable because
of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees. . . .” Id. at 400.  In
essence, co-workers have settled expectations based on the seniority system and depriv-
ing the co-workers of their expected benefits might impose an undue hardship on the
employer. Id. at 404-05.  Since the ADA obligates employers to provide only “reasona-
ble accommodations” that do not impose an “undue hardship,” the employee with a
disability is not entitled to his accommodation unless he can show, in effect, that “spe-
cial circumstances” exist such that his co-workers will suffer no ill effects from the ac-
commodation. Id. at 405-06.  The ADA’s emphasis on balancing “accommodation” and
“hardship” distinguishes it from Title VII and, therefore, means that courts must weigh
the effects of proposed remedies differently under the two statutes.  For a fuller discus-
sion of the Barnett decision, see Harris, supra note 44.
65. See Harris, supra note 48, at 1203-05 (discussing firm-specific skills and knowl-
edge in the internal labor market).
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remedies and layoff remedies.  In United States v. Paradise,66 the Su-
preme Court upheld the district court’s order requiring the Ala-
bama Department of Public Safety, which had never hired an
African-American employee before a court required it, to remedy
discrimination in its ranks, in part, by promoting one African-Amer-
ican state trooper to the rank of corporal for each white trooper
promoted to that rank.67  Yet, the Court upheld the remedy only
after assuring that white state troopers would not suffer undue
effects:
The one-for-one requirement did not impose an unac-
ceptable burden on innocent third parties. . . . [T]he tem-
porary and extremely limited nature of the requirement
substantially limits any potential burden on white appli-
cants for promotion.  It was used only once at the rank of
corporal and may not be utilized at all in the upper ranks.
Nor has the court imposed an ‘absolute bar’ to white ad-
vancement. . . .  Because the one-for-one requirement is
so limited in scope and duration, it only postpones the
promotions of qualified whites.68
Thus, a sharply limited “promotion remedy” will not deprive “inno-
cent” co-workers of the  dividends they expect from a continuing
relationship with their employer.  Instead, the victims of discrimina-
tion are entitled to equal opportunity in the workplace through
make-whole relief if, and only if, a promotions remedy requires
nothing more than postponing dividends for a brief time for a
small number of “innocent” workers.
These three categories of remedies help quantify how much is
“some of the burden of the remedy” for discrimination which the
Wygant Court suggested may be imposed on “innocents.”  A brief
postponement of expected dividends is permissible.  A deprivation
of some dividends is not.  The de minimis cost of losing one job out
of many fungible jobs is permissible.  A greater cost is not.  Such is
66. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).  Like Wygant, this case involved a constitutional claim,
but the principles for which it is cited here also apply in Title VII cases. See, e.g., In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 1541-42 (11th
Cir. 1994).
67. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 163-64 (describing the district court’s order).
68. Id. at 182-83.  For a further explanation of a similar effect, see Harris, supra
note 44, at 156-57.
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the equities balance when “innocence” puts a finger on the scales.
Such is the power of “innocence” in these remedies cases.  It is a
potent shield against all but the smallest consequences for
“innocents.”
B. Constitutional Affirmative Action Cases
A second line of cases illustrating the power of “innocence”
addresses the constitutionality of public actors’ voluntary, race-
based affirmative-action efforts. These cases have not always in-
volved workplace disputes.  Nonetheless, the cases discussed in this
section plainly govern workplace affirmative action in the public
sector.   They also offer further relevant evidence of the power of
“innocence” in the context of workplace discrimination.
The power of “innocence” has two manifestations in the cases
considering race-based affirmative action under the Constitution.
First, the Supreme Court has expressed deep skepticism that the
African-American beneficiaries of affirmative action are, in fact, vic-
tims of discrimination at all.  If they are not, of course, their claim
to the law’s care and protection is no more powerful than a claim
by other “innocent” non-victims.  The Court’s skepticism on this
point has resulted in the creation of a powerful presumption that
the victims of societal discrimination and “innocent” white workers
are morally equivalent.  Only compelling evidence of actual and im-
mediate discrimination propounded by a competent governmental
entity acting within the scope of its authority may overcome this
presumption.69
Second, the Supreme Court has seemingly constitutionalized
Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle; that is, “[t]he inter-
est of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only
when it converges with the interests of whites.”70  In the constitu-
69. David Chang explained the flaw in this reasoning; that is, why governmental
classifications based on racial prejudice are not morally equivalent to governmental
classifications seeking to compensate for the effects of past discrimination: “When dis-
advantaged by an affirmative action program designed to remedy the lingering effects
of past racial discrimination . . . an ‘innocent white victim’ is passed over not because he
is white, but because there is little or no reason to believe — based on his being white —
that he suffers from the effects of past racial discrimination.”  Chang, supra note 5, at
805-06.
70. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
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tional affirmative action cases, even if the Court concludes that the
African-American beneficiaries of public-sector affirmative action
have been victimized by societal discrimination, the Court will up-
hold governmental affirmative action plans when they serve the in-
terests of white citizens as well as the victims of societal
discrimination.
The power of “innocence” in the constitutional affirmative ac-
tion cases emerged at a low ebb in Fullilove v. Klutznick when a splin-
tered majority of the justices upheld the “minority business
enterprise” provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977
(PWEA).  This provision required that 10% of federal funding for
local public-works projects be used to employ minority-owned busi-
nesses.71  The Fullilove plurality’s opinion, penned by Chief Justice
Burger, seemingly did not endorse the suggestion that the set-aside
program’s beneficiaries and their white counterparts were morally
equivalent:
[A]lthough we may assume that the complaining parties
[i.e., non-minority contractors who did not benefit from
the set-aside program] are innocent of any discriminatory
conduct, it was within congressional power to act on the
assumption that in the past some nonminority businesses
may have reaped competitive benefit over the years from
the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these con-
tracting opportunities.72
Even after acknowledging that white contractors had benefited
from discrimination, however, Chief Justice Burger upheld the
PWEA’s set-aside program only after taking pains to explain that
white contractors would experience only slight effects.73
Justice Powell agreed that the effect on non-minority contrac-
tors — echoing his Franks opinion, he dubbed them “innocent
71. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980).  A majority was achieved by
patching together the three-member plurality, id. at 453 (plurality opinion), a concur-
rence by Justice Powell, id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring), and a concurrence by Justice
Marshall joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Id. at 517 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
72. Id. at 484-85.
73. Id. at 484.
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third parties” — was slight, if that great.74  But he concurred with
allowing the white contractors to be subjected to these slight effects
only after being satisfied that the African-American beneficiaries of
the PWEA’s set-aside program were, indeed, victims of discrimina-
tion.  In the jargon of constitutional affirmative action jurispru-
dence, “the legitimate interest in creating a race-conscious remedy
is not compelling unless an appropriate governmental authority has
found that such a [constitutional or statutory] violation has oc-
curred.”75  More simply, Justice Powell wanted powerful proof of
discrimination from someone he could trust.  Without this proof,
Powell would presume that the African-American beneficiaries of
affirmative action had not been the victims of discrimination and,
therefore, African-American contractors and white contractors were
morally equivalent.
By proposing what amounted to a rebuttable presumption of
moral equivalence between the African-American beneficiaries of
public-sector affirmative action and their “innocent” white counter-
parts, Justice Powell foreshadowed the growing power of “inno-
cence” in constitutional affirmative action cases.  A governmental
body advancing an affirmative action plan must have the requisite
authority to make a finding of race discrimination and it must actu-
ally make a finding that is sufficient in the Court’s eyes to rebut the
presumption of moral equivalence.76   In Fullilove, Justice Powell re-
viewed the evidence and concluded that “a court must accept as
established the conclusion that purposeful discrimination contrib-
uted significantly to the small percentage of federal contracting
funds that minority business enterprises have received.”77  But the
power of Powell’s rebuttable presumption, and hence the power of
“innocence,” grew in subsequent cases.
For example, the Court concluded that the presumption of
moral equivalence had not been rebutted in City of Richmond v. J. A.
74. Id. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring).  As described by Justice Powell, the effect
on white contractors in Fullilove resembles the effect on white workers in “hiring” reme-
dies cases. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
75. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at
274 (the Equal Protection Clause requires “some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved”).
76. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 506 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Croson Co.78  The Croson plurality79 endorsed Justice Powell’s view
that a competent governmental entity must find a constitutional or
statutory violation before a public-sector affirmative action plan
may be upheld.80  Mere assertions of “societal discrimination”
would not be sufficient to justify affirmative action.81  Rather, the
City of Richmond needed “a ‘strong basis in evidence for its conclu-
sion that remedial action was necessary.’”82 Without this evidence,
“[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is
irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost
in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently un-
measurable claims of past wrongs.”83
No member of the Croson Court voiced doubts about the his-
tory of race discrimination in the United States.  To the contrary,
Justice O’Connor proclaimed that “there is no doubt that the sorry
history of both private and public discrimination in this country has
contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs.”84
Even Justice Scalia, arguably the Court’s most consistent and vigor-
ous opponent of affirmative action at that time, conceded the exis-
tence of race discrimination: “blacks have suffered discrimination
immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups.”85
But Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Croson, accused the Court’s
majority of sending “signals that it regards racial discrimination as
78. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
79. The Croson Court was also splintered. See id.  Justice O’Connor authored the
plurality’s opinion. Id. at 476 (plurality opinion).  Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
White, concurred separately. Id. at 476 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part). Justice
Kennedy also concurred separately and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice White. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 496-97.  In constitutional equal protection jargon, this debate focuses on
whether “strict scrutiny” must be applied to any racial classification, or merely to racial
classifications that disadvantage groups that have suffered a history of victimization. Id.
at 493 . See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 218-27 (describing the history of
constitutional affirmative action jurisprudence).
81. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at  276).  Even the phrase
“societal discrimination” diffuses responsibility for the modern condition of African-
Americans and women thereby reinforcing the idea that “innocents” are blame-free
and deserve protection from any harm. See Ross, Innocence, supra note 4, at 313.
82. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
83. Id. at 505-06.
84. Id. at 499.
85. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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largely a phenomenon of the past, and that government bodies
need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injus-
tice.”86 The Court’s majority offered no explanation why, if racial
discrimination was the expected condition, it should enforce a pow-
erful presumption that all discrimination had disappeared.  Fur-
ther, why must state and local governments prove that
discrimination persists when even the Court’s most conservative
members acknowledge our society’s history of discrimination and
proffer no evidence that discrimination has disappeared from the
American workplace?  Viewed from this perspective, this counter-
factual, counter-intuitive requirement resembles an obstacle er-
ected for its own sake.
Nonetheless, the Croson Court essentially held that the pre-
sumption of moral equivalence between the African-American vic-
tims of discrimination and white “innocents” must be rebutted or
the principle of treating equivalent people equally would be un-
avoidably offended.  In Croson, the City of Richmond did not pro-
duce sufficient evidence to rebut this powerful presumption of
moral equivalence.87 Thus, the power of “innocence” required
striking down the City’s construction set-aside program.88
The Court might have reconciled the conflicting outcomes in
Croson and Fullilove by holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
mandated judicial deference to Congress because of its unique
competence to find evidence rebutting the presumption of moral
86. Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see generally Ross, Rhetorical Tapestry, supra
note 4, at 5-6 (discussing how Justice Taney in the Dred Scott decision evaded responsi-
bility by assigning it to preceding generations); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 813-14 (dis-
cussing how “innocence” rhetoric casts responsibility for discrimination into the past).
87. Croson, 488 U.S. at 480 (“There was no direct evidence of race discrimination
on the part of the city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city’s prime contrac-
tors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors.”); see also id. at 479-80
(discussing the evidence propounded by the City). But see id. at 528-29 (Marshall, J.
dissenting) (as “the former capital of the Confederacy . . . [a]s much as any municipal-
ity in the United States, Richmond knows what racial discrimination is; a century of
decisions by this and other federal courts has richly documented the city’s disgraceful
history of public and private racial discrimination.”).
88. Id. at 493 (“The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to
compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race.  To
whatever racial group these citizens belong, their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with
equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole crite-
rion in an aspect of public decisionmaking.”).
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equivalence.  This principle would have implied that other govern-
mental entities, like the City of Richmond, could not rely on the
same deference because they lacked equal constitutional stature.89
In part, the Court relied on this distinction when it upheld a fed-
eral broadcasting set-aside program in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC.90  Yet, the Court finally rejected this distinction in Adarand
Constructors v. Pena when it struck down a congressionally mandated
federal construction set-aside program.91  The Court reaffirmed the
“innocence”-inspired presumption of moral equivalency by effec-
tively requiring that courts approach any evidence purporting to
rebut the presumption — without regard to its source — with the
deepest skepticism.92
The Court has increasingly suggested that acceding to Con-
gress’ or some other governmental body’s finding of discrimination
is not enough to justify upholding a public-sector affirmative action
plan.  As in the remedies cases, courts faced with powerful evidence
of discrimination must decide how much “innocent” third parties
may be affected in the effort to remedy that discrimination.  In sev-
eral constitutional affirmative action cases, the Court has strongly
implied it will not sustain public-sector race-based affirmative action
for African-Americans when “innocent” whites experience even
slight effects — that is, the very low level effects adjudged permissi-
ble in the remedies cases.  Rather, beginning with Justice Powell’s
concurrence in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,93 the
Court has effectively required a showing that affirmative action ben-
efits everyone — victims of discrimination and “innocents” alike.
89. Congress’ role as the factfinder in this case loomed large in the Fullilove plural-
ity’s opinion. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475-78; see also id. at 516-17 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 (holding that a similar construction set-aside
program established by the City of Richmond was unconstitutional, in part because
“Congress . . . has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Four-
teenth Amendment” while states and cities do not).
90. 497 U.S. 547, 565-66, 572 (1990).  In addition to Congress’ special authority
and the quantum of evidence rebutting the presumption of moral equivalency, the
Metro Broadcasting Court also found the effect on non-minorities to be “slight.” See id. at
553-54, 597-600.  In the jargon of equal protection jurisprudence, the Court also held
that “benign” racial classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny rather than “strict
scrutiny.” See id. at 564, 620 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).
91. 515 U.S. 200, 230-01 (1995).
92. See id. at 228-30, 237.
93. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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In Bakke, speaking only for himself, Justice Powell voted to
strike down the University of California’s affirmative action plan for
admissions to the UC Davis medical school.  He also signaled his
willingness to approve future affirmative action efforts by public
higher education institutions if they served interests which Powell
considered compelling.94  Powell concluded that affirmative action
to expand access to medical education for socially, economically,
and educationally disadvantaged groups — that is, benefiting the
victims of societal discrimination — could not be legitimate, much
less compelling.95  But universities have a compelling interest in the
“attainment of a diverse student body”96 when they exercise their
“right to select those students who will contribute the most to the
‘robust exchange of ideas,’”97 thereby enhancing “[t]he atmos-
phere of ‘speculation, experiment and creation’ — so essential to
the quality of higher education.”98 Institutions of higher education
provide a better learning environment — like Harvard, Justice Pow-
ell’s affirmative action exemplar99 — when students from diverse
backgrounds share their experiences.100  In sum, Justice Powell was
willing to approve affirmative action if it improved the education
provided to all students, not merely students from disadvantaged
backgrounds.
A majority of the Court recently endorsed Justice Powell’s
Bakke position in Grutter v. Bollinger.101  The University of Michi-
gan’s lawyers obviously read Justice Powell’s opinion closely.  They
offered “only one justification for their use of race in the admis-
94. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a governmental entity has a com-
pelling interest in remedying its own discrimination. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 492-93.
This interest was not asserted in Bakke.
95. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.  This judgment was bound up with Justice Powell’s view
that the faculty of the UC-Davis medical school was not a competent governmental
authority entitled to deference on the question of whether the beneficiaries of its af-
firmative action plan had been the victims of discrimination. See id. at 307-10.  Thus, the
presumption of moral equivalence had not been rebutted.
96. Id. at 311.
97. Id. at 313.
98. Id. at 312.
99. See id. at 321 (appendix discussing Harvard’s affirmative action plan).
100. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (explaining why all medical students and graduates will
benefit from a heterogeneous student body).  Justice Powell also required that race and
ethnicity not stand as the only “diversity” factors considered. Id. at 315.
101. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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sions process: obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body.’”102 Relying heavily on the reasoning in Jus-
tice Powell’s opinion, the Court’s majority agreed with the Univer-
sity that the school’s interest in “viewpoint diversity” was
compelling.103
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, muddied these wa-
ters slightly by introducing a second definition of “diversity” —
“representational diversity” — to justify the Court’s conclusion.
Representational diversity differs from Justice Powell’s viewpoint di-
versity because it would require that “the diffusion of knowledge
and opportunity through public institutions of higher education
must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnic-
ity.”104  This definition harkens back to the UC Davis medical
school’s argument in Bakke that it had a compelling interest in ben-
efiting the victims of societal discrimination by expanding access to
higher education for socially, economically, and educationally dis-
advantaged groups.  Justice Powell made clear in his Bakke opinion
that representational diversity could never be sufficiently compel-
ling to justify governmental affirmative action.
Justice O’Connor overcame this complication with the same in-
terest-convergence argument that allowed her to conclude that
viewpoint diversity is a compelling interest.  More precisely, repre-
sentational diversity perfects democracy for all Americans: “In or-
der to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open
to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.”105
In sum, every citizen of the United States benefits from representa-
tional diversity just as every student attending the University of
Michigan’s law school benefits from viewpoint diversity.  Both forms
of diversity, therefore, are compelling interests.  The law school’s
affirmative action plan could be upheld.106
102. Id. at 328.
103. Id. at 328-33.
104. Id. at 331.
105. Id. at 332.
106. Justice O’Connor reiterated Justice Powell’s requirement that “diversity” pro-
grams in higher education admissions must take into account non-racial factors when
they take race into account, and may only treat race as one “‘plus’ factor.” See id. at 336-
42.
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A question remains whether the Court’s holding in Grutter ap-
plies broadly outside the higher education context.107  Both Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter and Justice Powell’s opinion
in Bakke justified their conclusions, in part, by relying on universi-
ties’ “special niche in our constitutional tradition” rooted in the
First Amendment’s implicit protection of academic freedom.108
But no such question remains with respect to the Court’s require-
ment that governmental affirmative action plans benefit “in-
nocents” and victims of discrimination alike.  In Croson, Justice
O’Connor derided the City of Richmond for turning to race-con-
scious remedies for societal discrimination when it had “at its dispo-
sal an array of race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility of
city contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races.”109
Justice Stevens concurred and distinguished Richmond’s program
from the Jackson Board of Education’s efforts, upheld in Wygant, to
increase diversity in its public school faculty: “the city makes no
claim that the public interest in the efficient performance of its con-
struction contracts will be served by granting a preference to minor-
ity-business enterprises.”110  Of course, the Court struck down the
City of Richmond’s set-aside program.
Similarly, the Metro Broadcasting Court upheld the FCC’s mi-
nority set-aside program, in part, because “the viewing and listening
public suffers when minorities are underrepresented among own-
ers of television and radio stations.”111  The Court explained that
“expanded minority ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the ag-
gregate, result in greater broadcast diversity.  A broadcasting indus-
try with representative minority participation will produce more
107. See, e.g., Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 2426 (2004) (upholding city police department’s affirmative action plan and rely-
ing on Grutter); see generally Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace:
The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263 (2003-04) (discussing Grutter’s application to
workplace cases).
108. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
109. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (emphasis added); id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at
312-13 (“The atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment, and creation’— so essential to
the quality of higher education — is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse stu-
dent body.  As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the ‘nation’s
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of
students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”).
111. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 554.
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variation and diversity than will one whose ownership is drawn from
a single racially and ethnically homogeneous group.”112  Thus,
“[t]he benefits of such diversity are not limited to the members of
the minority groups who gain access to the broadcasting industry by
virtue of the ownership policies; rather, the benefits redound to all
members of the viewing and listening audience.”113  Reading Bakke,
Grutter, Croson, Wygant, and Metro Broadcasting together strongly sup-
ports the conclusion that the Court will uphold governmental af-
firmative action when it benefits morally equivalent  “innocents”
and victims of discrimination.
The Supreme Court has never explained why serving the inter-
ests of “innocents” is “compelling,” while serving the interests of the
victims of societal discrimination, or even society’s interest in elimi-
nating the vestiges of societal discrimination, is not.  Similarly, the
Court has never explained why and how the Constitution estab-
lishes that white workers and male workers have a “fundamental
right” to continue receiving benefits denied to them by affirmative
action policies.114 Apparently, such traditional forms of constitu-
tional analysis are not required when “innocence” is at play.
The constitutional affirmative action cases show the power of
“innocence” at its peak.  It is powerful enough to require acute and
barely rebuttable skepticism that African-Americans have been vic-
timized by discrimination in American society.  Absent powerful evi-
dence to rebut the presumption, the victims of societal
discrimination and their “innocent” co-workers are morally
equivalent and, therefore, entitled to the same care and protection
from the law.  In the remedies cases, where discrimination against
identified parties has been proven, “innocence” yields to a remedy
only if “innocent third parties” experience nothing worse than
slight effects.  In these governmental affirmative action cases, “inno-
cence” will not yield absent an equivalent finding by a competent
governmental authority.  Further, even in the face of such a find-
112. Id. at 579.  The Court made the connection between this argument and Justice
Powell’s Bakke opinion explicit in another part of its decision. See id. at 567-68.  Al-
though Metro Broadcasting was subsequently partly overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Adarand Court did not expressly reject this aspect of
the Metro Broadcasting decision.
113. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 568.
114. See Chang, supra note 5, at 810-13; see also Harris, supra note 14, at 1769-76.
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ing, public-sector affirmative action plans must benefit the innocent
as well as the victimized.  If not, they risk being struck down.  In
other words, “innocence” under the Constitution is more than a
shield against harms real and perceived.  “Innocence,” at least in
this context, demands the same degree of care and protection to
which a sleeping infant would be entitled.
C. Title VII’s Affirmative Action Cases
The power of “innocence” is at its comparative weakest when
white or male workers bring claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 challenging their employers’ voluntary affirma-
tive action plans.  Although Title VII protects both white workers
and African-American workers against discrimination because of
race,115 the Supreme Court’s decision in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber rejected the argument that Title VII presumed the
moral equivalence of white workers and African-American workers:
“[I]t was clear to Congress that ‘[t]he crux of the problem [was] to
open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which
have been traditionally closed to them,’ and it was to this problem
that Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination in employ-
ment was primarily addressed.”116  Thus, voluntary affirmative ac-
tion, to the extent it serves the goal of promoting equal
employment opportunity, must be permitted:
[I]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Na-
tion’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and in-
tended to improve the lot of those who had “been
excluded from the American dream for so long,” consti-
tuted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, pri-
vate, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy.117
115. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); see also On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (confirming that both men
and women may bring sex discrimination claims under Title VII).  Of course, the appli-
cability of Title VII to voluntary private-sector affirmative action means that the employ-
ment at-will rule does not inform this analysis in the same way it informed the
discussion of the Title VII remedies cases.
116. 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 204 (citation omitted). See also Johnson v. Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
645 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The logic of antidiscrimination legislation re-
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By recognizing that Congress rejected any presumption of
moral equivalence between the victims of discrimination and their
co-workers, the Supreme Court has given little power to “inno-
cence” in its Title VII affirmative action cases.  In the constitutional
affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court required the public-
sector purveyors of affirmative action to rebut the presumption of
moral equivalence by offering compelling evidence of discrimina-
tion found by a competent governmental authority. Under Title
VII, employers may implement a voluntary affirmative action plan
without establishing a prima facie case that they have violated anti-
discrimination law, or even that there was an arguable violation.118
Instead, they can demonstrate the validity of their affirmative action
plans by showing only “the existence of a ‘manifest imbalance’ that
reflected under-representation of [a disadvantaged group] in ‘tradi-
tionally segregated job categories.’”119
In the absence of a presumption of moral equivalence, Title
VII also frees the purveyors of voluntary affirmative action from the
obligation imposed in the constitutional affirmative action cases of
proving that their plans benefit the “innocent” as well as the victims
of discrimination.  To the contrary, affirmative action plans may
have consequences — sometimes significant consequences — for
white and male employees, as long as the plans do not “unnecessa-
rily trammel the interests of white [and male] employees.”120
Trammeling prohibited by the Constitution is permitted by Title
VII.  Only “unnecessary” trammeling is forbidden by the statute.
Further, the Court’s Title VII affirmative action jurisprudence
gives substantially greater latitude in the creation of affirmative ac-
tion plans than the remedies cases have afforded to courts seeking
to provide relief for proven workplace discrimination.  In the reme-
dies cases, the Supreme Court decreed that courts may allow “inno-
cent” workers to be subjected to de minimis effects.  Hiring remedies
are permitted, while promotions remedies are acceptable only if
quires that judicial constructions of Title VII leave ‘breathing room’ for employer initia-
tives to benefit members of minority groups.”).
118. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630-33; see also Weber, 443 U.S. at 210-15 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (discussing the “arguable violation” standard rejected by the majority).
119. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631.  A proper comparison with the relevant labor market
is, of course, essential to this inquiry. See id. at 636.
120. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
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strictly limited, and layoff remedies are essentially prohibited.121  In
the Title VII affirmative action cases, employers are prohibited
from “requir[ing] the discharge of white workers and their replace-
ment with new black hirees.”122  Of course, firing a white worker in
order to hire an African-American worker is a qualitatively different
action than laying off a white employee to retain an incumbent Afri-
can-American employee.
Under Title VII, employers voluntarily implementing affirma-
tive action plans are also prohibited from “creat[ing] an absolute
bar to the advancement of white employees.”123  Again, absolutely
barring advancement is qualitatively different from and far more
serious than a promotion remedies’ elevation of an African-Ameri-
can before a white employee who remains eligible for a later pro-
motion.  Finally, Title VII requires that any affirmative action plan
must be temporary because, while it is permissible “to eliminate a
manifest racial imbalance,” it is not legitimate to “maintain racial
balance.”124 This loose constraint does nothing more than require
that affirmative action plans eventually expire, although there is no
obligation to schedule the sunset in advance.
In sum, the power of “innocence” in Title VII affirmative ac-
tion cases does not award “innocent” workers a strong presumption
of moral equivalence with the victims of discrimination.  Without
this presumption, the Title VII affirmative action cases protect
white and male workers only from truly significant harms that
might result from an affirmative action plan.  The power of “inno-
cence” is at its weakest when confronted with Congress’ directive to
assure equal employment opportunity.
III. THE SOPRANOS AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF “INNOCENCE”
As the preceding section demonstrates, the power of “inno-
cence” in these workplace discrimination cases is evident.  The Su-
preme Court’s definition of “innocence” is less so.  Most of the
cases discussed in the preceding section do not explicitly choose
between the different definitions of “innocence” with which this es-
121. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
122. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (1979) (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 208.
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say began.  But Justice Powell almost certainly spoke for all of the
Court’s defenders of “innocence” when he described the “inno-
cent” co-workers of the victims of discrimination as “not the wrong-
doers.”125  More precisely, “[a]bsent some showing of collusion, the
incumbent employee was not a party to the discrimination by the
employer. Acceptance of the job when offered hardly makes one an
accessory to a discriminatory failure to hire someone else.”126
Thus, Powell claimed only the narrow, technical definition of “in-
nocence” for his “innocents;” that is, “[f]reedom from specific guilt;
the fact of not being guilty of that which one is charged; guiltless-
ness.”127  But Powell did not and could not claim that his “in-
nocents” fit the broader, moral definition: “[f]reedom from sin,
guilt, or moral wrong in general; the state of being untainted with,
or unacquainted with, evil; moral purity.”128
Workers who are “not the wrongdoers” do not, without more,
deserve the same type of care and protection that might be af-
forded the sleeping infant who exemplifies the broadest definition
of “innocence.”  Yet, as the preceding section demonstrates, Powell
and many of his brother and sister justices were willing to vest white
and male workers who were merely “not the wrongdoers” with the
power suggested by the metaphor of the sleeping infant: a claim to
125. Franks, 424 U.S. at 789 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see
also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring) (defining “innocent third parties”
as “innocent of wrongdoing”).
126. Franks, 424 U.S. at 789 (Powell, J., concurring); accord Croson, 488 U.S. at 516
(Stevens, J. concurring) (“The ordinance is equally vulnerable because of its failure to
identify the characteristics of the disadvantaged class of white contractors that justify
the disparate treatment.  That class unquestionably includes some white contractors
who are guilty of past discrimination against blacks, but it is only habit, rather than
evidence or analysis, that makes it seem acceptable to assume that every white contrac-
tor covered by the ordinance shares in that guilt.   Indeed, even among those who have
discriminated in the past, it must be assumed that at least some of them have complied
with the city ordinance that has made such discrimination unlawful since 1975.  Thus,
the composition of the disadvantaged class of white contractors presumably includes
some who have been guilty of unlawful discrimination, some who practiced discrimina-
tion before it was forbidden by law, and some who have never discriminated against
anyone on the basis of race.”). Cf. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 525 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(“The color of a person’s skin and the country of his origin are immutable facts that
bear no relation to . . . moral culpability, or any other characteristics of constitutionally
permissible interest to government.”).
127. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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the care and protection of the law equal, or even superior, to the
claims of discrimination’s victims.  In essence, the Court has con-
flated the narrow definition of “innocence” with the broader defini-
tion.  Or, more precisely, the Court has demonstrated that it will
exercise the immense moral power that may be derived from the
broader definition and its exemplar, the sleeping infant, on behalf
of white and male workers to whom that broader definition simply
does not apply.
This section challenges the Supreme Court’s bait-and-switch of
these two qualitatively different definitions of “innocence.”  Specifi-
cally, this section challenges the Court’s implicit conclusion that
workers who are “innocent” only because they have not committed
a specific wrongful act deserve the same care and protection from
the law as the victims of discrimination.  This section concludes that
white and male workers do not, merely because of their “inno-
cence,” deserve such care and protection.  Rather, this section will
show that these workers’ “innocence” is and should be almost en-
tirely irrelevant to the question of how discrimination should be
remedied.  “Innocence” amounts to little more than an elaborate
cover for the Court’s own policy preference with respect to remedy-
ing discrimination in the workplace.  Finally, this section proposes a
different approach to remedying workplace discrimination that,
without reference to “innocence,” would require white and male
workers to relinquish any ill-gotten gains from discrimination and
return them to the victims of discrimination.
The Soprano family offers a helpful framework for this exami-
nation.  Tony Soprano is the de facto boss of an organized crime
“family” in northern New Jersey.129   He is also the de jure head of a
dysfunctional nuclear family consisting of his wife, Carmela; his col-
lege-age daughter, Meadow; and his son, AJ.  Each member of
Tony’s nuclear family has a different relationship to Tony’s life of
crime.  It is the relationship between each family member and
Tony’s crimes, rather than the Sopranos’ complex intra-familial re-
lationships or Tony’s relationship with his crime family, that pro-
129. Corrado “Junior” Soprano, Tony’s uncle, is technically the “boss” of the So-
prano “family.”  Tony is the “underboss” and “acting boss.” See ALLEN RUCKER, THE
SOPRANOS: A FAMILY HISTORY ch. 4 (2001) (“Soprano Crime Family Tree”).   Yet, Tony
actually runs the “family.”  His uncle is little more than a figurehead. Id. at ch. 4 (“He’s
a hands-off Don.”).
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vides special insight into the idea and power of “innocence.”  The
questions to be answered in this section are, which Soprano is “in-
nocent,” why, and should it matter.
A. Is Tony Soprano “Innocent”?
Tony Soprano is both the starting place for this inquiry and its
easiest case. Tony has personally committed murder, assault, extor-
tion, and grand theft, among other crimes.130  He also runs illegal
gambling operations and corrupts union and public officials.131
Even as a teenager, Tony stole cars and committed other of-
fenses.132   Consistent with his leadership role in his crime “family,”
Tony also directs “capos,” “soldiers,” and “associates,” whether di-
rectly or indirectly, to commit these crimes and others.133 No defi-
nition of “innocence” can maintain the concept’s integrity and
encompass Tony Soprano.  If innocence means anything, it cannot
be synonymous with criminal guilt.134
Criminal law enthusiasts might retort that Tony suffers from
diminished capacity that would be relevant to any adjudication of
his guilt.  Yet, Dr. Jennifer Melfi, Tony’s psychiatrist,135 has diag-
nosed Tony only with panic attacks, anxiety, and depression.136
Tony is not a psychopath.137  While he may evidence Freudian
“splitting,” which allows him to harbor contradictory attitudes and
130. See id. at ch. 8 (explaining how the mob will steal money from and through a
legitimate business — a so-called “bust out” — thereby driving the business into a
planned bankruptcy to settle the owner’s gambling or other debts).
131. See id. (“With the Sopranos, they’re heavily into organized labor, but their
main thing is gambling. . . .”); see also id. (explaining the connection between illegal
gambling operations, and extortion and loan sharking).
132. See id. at ch. 3 (“[W]e busted the kid a few times in high school, stealing cars,
mostly.”).
133. See id. at ch. 4 (“Almost no one does anything without checking with Tony.”).
134. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.  At the time of this writing, Tony
faces an indictment for wire fraud arising out of illegally obtained and distributed air-
line tickets; however, his case has not yet gone to trial. See RUCKER, supra note 129, at
ch. 4; see also id. at ch. 10 (“indictment” filed in U.S. District Court for New Jersey).
135. See RUCKER, supra note 129, at ch. 7.
136. See GLEN O. GABBARD, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SOPRANOS:  LOVE, DEATH, DE-
SIRE, AND BETRAYAL IN AMERICA’S FAVORITE GANGSTER FAMILY 24-26 (2002).  There is
some question whether Tony’s depression is organic, environmental, or a product of
toxicity from drugs prescribed by Dr. Melfi. Id. at 25.
137. See id. at 28-31; see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 645-50 (4th ed. 1994) (describing “Antiso-
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beliefs,138 his condition would not satisfy either the federal criminal
code’s or New Jersey’s definition of “insanity.”139  Thus, regardless
of his emotional problems, Tony cannot satisfy even Justice Powell’s
“not the wrongdoers” definition of “innocence.”
Quite apart from any legal claim of diminished capacity, an
argument could be raised that Tony’s parentage frees him from any
moral blame for his actions.  Tony’s father — “Johnny Boy” So-
prano — was a “capo” in the DiMeo family.140  Tony merely fol-
lowed him into the family business with the encouragement of his
father’s morality teachings.  For example, when Tony witnessed
Johnny Boy chopping a finger off the hand of pork-store owner Mr.
Satriale, Johnny Boy instructed Tony that Mr. Satriale was “a gam-
bler.  He got over his head in debt.  He owed me money, and he
refused to pay.  He avoided me . . .  What was I supposed to do?
That’s my livelihood.  That’s how I put food on the table . . .  Let
this be a lesson to you.  A man honors his debts.”141  Violence is not
a sin; gambling and not paying debts are.  Tony adopted this moral
code as his own, despite its lasting emotional imprint manifested in
his panic attacks.142
Tony’s mother was a mob Medea.143  During Tony’s childhood,
she threatened Johnny Boy that she would smother their children
with a pillow if Johnny Boy moved the family to Reno, Nevada.144
She threatened to gouge young Tony’s eyes out with a fork when he
pleaded for an electric organ.145  Most significant, in Tony’s adult-
cial Personality Disorder”).  Even if Tony were a psychopath, it is unlikely that he would
evade culpability under criminal law. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
138. See GABBARD, supra note 136, at 36-39.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (federal law’s “insanity” defense); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:4-1 (1995) (New Jersey’s “insanity” defense).
140. See RUCKER, supra note 129, at ch. 4 (“DiMeo decided to give Johnny his own
crew.”).  The DiMeo family was the precursor to the Soprano crime family. See Cast and
Crew: Tony Soprano (played by James Gandolfini), at http://www.hbo.com/sopranos/cast/
character/tony_soprano.shtml (July 13, 2004); Mark McGuire, Anything You Can Do, I
Can Do Badder, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Mar. 7, 2004, at S2; Robert Bianco, The
Family, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2002, at 2A.
141. See GABBARD, supra note 136, at 114.
142. See id. at 114-15.
143. While I wish I could claim authorship of this insight, Glen Gabbard cites Ellen
Willis as suggesting Medea as an appropriate metaphor for Livia. See id. at 99-100.
144. See The Sopranos: Down Neck (HBO, Feb. 21, 1999), available at http://www.
sopranoland.com/episodes/ep07/transcript/index2.html.
145. See GABBARD, supra note 136, at 101.
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hood, she conspired with Uncle Junior to have Tony killed.146  Dr.
Melfi believes that Livia suffered from borderline personality disor-
der.147  Regardless, Livia haunts Tony.148
Nonetheless, while Tony’s background complicates his psycho-
logical profile, it does not give him a legitimate claim to “inno-
cence.”  Of course, Tony’s parentage would not require a verdict of
“not guilty” for any crime with which he might be charged.  Tony’s
argument for moral “innocence” pursuant to the broader defini-
tion of that term would be equally unavailing.  The infant — the
paradigmatic moral “innocent” — makes no choices.  Infants are
pure instinct and reflex.  Any parent could testify at length that in-
fants occasionally commit unwelcome acts like spitting up, crying in
the middle of the night, and excreting unexpectedly.  But each of
these acts is wholly involuntary.  Infants are incapable of volitional
acts.  Tony Soprano is.  Tony chose to become a mobster.  He pur-
sues each criminal act willingly, often with malice aforethought.
Each act serves either his goal of amassing greater power and
wealth or a Mafia code of revenge or loyalty.  Bad parenting may
help explain Tony’s choices, but it does not excuse them or keep
his acts from being wrongful.149  By any reasonable definition of the
word, Tony Soprano is not “innocent.”
B. Is Carmela Soprano “Innocent”?
Carmela Soprano has never engaged in a volitional wrongful
act.150  She does not “collude” with Tony in the commission of his
146. See RUCKER, supra note 129, at ch. 4 (“The FBI has hard evidence that Junior
and Tony’s mother, Livia, decided to have him killed.”).
147. See, e.g., GABBARD, supra note 136, at 72; see also id. at 104 (“Dr. Melfi tells Tony
that his mother probably has a borderline personality disorder.  This diagnosis might
actually be charitable because Livia is much closer to being a true psychopath than
Tony.”).
148. See, e.g., id. at 68-69, 95, 99-100, 102, 110.
149. See id. at 82 (“[C]an ‘bad behavior’ be understood as growing out of conflict
and adverse childhood experience without completely absolving the patient of responsi-
bility for his actions?  Of course it can. You are not responsible for what happened to
you as a child. But you are responsible for what you do as an adult, no matter how much
you are influenced by unconscious forces stemming from childhood experiences.”).
150. This sentence may overstate the case slightly.  Carmela has helped hide guns
and money from the FBI. See id. at 133. Also, one of the most entertaining aspects of
Carmela Soprano’s character is that she has been eager to commit the wrongful act of
adultery for several years, but only recently succeeded in consummating her desires
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crimes.151  In Justice Powell’s language, she is “not the wrongdoer.”
A superficial understanding of Justice Powell’s assignment of the
moral power of the sleeping infant to workers who are “not the
wrongdoers” would suggest that Carmela Soprano satisfies the nar-
row definition of “innocence” and, therefore, can legitimately claim
a special entitlement to the law’s care and protection.  Yet, this un-
derstanding of “innocence” rather quickly becomes untenable and,
in fairness, does not give Justice Powell and his high court col-
leagues their best argument.
If society conferred the power to demand superior care and
protection on an individual simply because that individual had not
committed a volitional criminal act, the overwhelming majority of
Americans who never commit a crime or misdemeanor would have
a legitimate claim.  Since virtually every American could properly
compete with every other American, a claim to the power of “inno-
cence” would become meaningless.  It would decide no cases be-
cause it would be available to just about every party in just about
every case.  This definition cannot be what Justice Powell and his
colleagues had in mind.
But there are two types of “not the wrongdoers.”  Carmela So-
prano exemplifies the type of “not the wrongdoer” who should be
least entitled to a special claim on the law’s care and protection.
Carmela has benefited tremendously from Tony’s crimes.  She lives
in an expensive house, drives a nice car, and owns a mink coat and
a lot of expensive jewelry.152  All of her high living is made possible
and, perhaps predictably, it ended in unhappiness for her. See, e.g., id. at 127-28
(describing Carmela’s sexually charged, but chaste, relationship with “Father Phil”); The
Sopranos: Bust Out (HBO, Mar. 19, 2000), available at http://www.hbo.com/sopranos/
episode/season2/episode23.shtml (describing Carmela and Vic Musto’s romantic kiss
in her bathroom); The Sopranos: The Strong Silent Type (HBO, Nov. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/season4/episode49.shtml (Carmela confess-
ing to Rosalie Aprile that she lusts after Furio, one of Tony’s “soldier[s]”); The Sopranos:
Sentimental Education (HBO, Apr. 11, 2004), available at http://www.hbo.com/sopra-
nos/episode/season5/episode58.shtml (Carmela finally succeeds in committing adul-
tery with Bob Wegler, AJ’s school guidance counselor).
151. In one episode, Carmela visited a psychiatrist who, after hearing her descrip-
tion of Tony’s criminality followed by her claim that he is a good man and a good
father, called her “an enabler” rather than “an accomplice.” See GABBARD, supra note
136, at 129-30.
152. See Sopranos May Get an Offer They Can’t Refuse, THE IRISH TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002,
at 53 (discussing the value of the Sopranos’ home); David Zurawik, The Pleasure and
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by Tony’s criminal conduct.  Further, Carmela knows about Tony’s
occupation.  While she has never participated in his crimes and
probably does not know the specific details of particular crimes,
there is no doubt that she knows he commits crimes and that those
crimes finance her lifestyle.153
It is essential to note, however, that Carmela is not just a pas-
sive recipient of the proceeds of crime. Carmela chose to marry
Tony, at least in part, because she knew he was going to become a
mobster and she wanted to live that lifestyle.154  It seems that she
was exposed to the mob lifestyle during her childhood.  Her cousin
Dickie Moltisanti was an associate of the DiMeo family.155  Carmela
also grew up in a neighborhood where mobsters like “Johnny Boy”
Soprano were well known and admired, at least by some.156
Carmela made her choice of spouse with a good understanding of
the consequences of that choice.
Like Tony, Carmela is capable of volitional acts.  Carmela had
other choices before she married Tony, but she chose a man she
knew was aiming for a life of crime.  Further, any time after Tony
succeeded fabulously in the mob and richly financed her comforta-
ble lifestyle, Carmela could have made other choices.  Carmela is an
emancipated adult capable of making independent decisions.  She
could have divorced or simply abandoned Tony at any point after
Pain of Gunning Down Capitalism, THE BALTIMORE SUN, May 20, 2001, at 2F (the Sopra-
nos drive luxury cars); Jennifer Boeth et al., Sopranos/Season 1, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY,
Sept. 6, 2002, at 29 (some of Carmela’s jewelry is stolen).
153. See GABBARD, supra note 136, at 127 (Carmela confesses to Father Phil); DAVID
CHASE, THE SELECTED SCRIPTS FROM THREE SEASONS 109-10 (2002) (Carmela confesses
that she has “committed the sin of omission” through her knowledge that Tony “has
committed horrible acts,” but that she did so because she wanted a good life for her
family: “I wanted this house, money in my hands, money to buy anything I ever
wanted”); The Sopranos: Mergers and Acquisitions (HBO, Nov. 3, 2002), available at http://
www.sopranoland.com/episodes/ep47/ (Carmela steals $40,000 in cash from Tony’s
hidden stash in his duck food bin); see also Matthew Gilbert, The Beauty of Edie Falco: Her
Stellar Portrayal of Carmela Soprano is Complex, Subtle, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 2004, at
D1 (to resolve their separation, Carmela allows Tony to move back into their house only
on the condition that he invest $600,000 in Carmela’s real estate venture).
154. See RUCKER, supra note 129, at ch. 6 (“Mary and Hugh strictly forbade Carmela
from associating with Tony but she did it anyway.”).
155. See id. at ch. 6 (“‘Cousin Dickie’ . . . was a thug. . . .”).
156. See id. (“She grew up in the same Italian-American world that [Tony] did.”).
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his criminal conduct began.157  Yet, until his adultery finally humili-
ated her beyond her capacity for denial, Carmela chose to remain
with Tony Soprano and benefit from his wrongdoing.  In fact, even
after separating from Tony, Carmela continued to benefit from
Tony’s crimes.  And then she took him back.158
No one who knowingly and willfully puts herself in a position
to benefit from the criminal conduct of another person should be
permitted to stake a legitimate claim to the power of “innocence.”
Carmela is not guilty.  But as an active seeker of wrongfulness’ pro-
ceeds, she does not stand on the same moral plain as a discrimina-
tion victim.
Carmela’s active pursuit — rather than passive receipt— of the
proceeds of crime distinguishes her from Justice Powell’s “not the
wrongdoers.” In most cases, perhaps many cases, white male work-
ers do not knowingly and willfully put themselves in a  position to
reap the benefits of workplace discrimination against women and
people of color.  They simply seek available jobs and receive the
benefits of their “whiteness” or “maleness” when their applications
are accepted, their promotions are granted, or their seniority pro-
tects them from a layoff.  Thus, while Carmela Soprano is “not the
wrongdoer,” she is a different type of “not the wrongdoer” from the
“innocents” receiving care and protection from the Supreme Court
in the workplace discrimination cases.
C. Are Meadow Soprano and AJ Soprano “Innocent”?
1. “Innocence,” Volition, and Knowledge
If Carmela Soprano’s active pursuit of the proceeds of crime
suggests one understanding of “not the wrongdoer,” then Meadow
Soprano exemplifies another.  Like her mother, Meadow has not
157. I do not mean to suggest that she could have done so without risk.  Because of
her knowledge of Tony’s criminal conduct, her life could be in danger if she were to
leave Tony. Cf. The Sopranos: Long-Term Parking (HBO, May 23, 2003), available at http:/
/www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/season5/episode64.shtml (Christopher Moltisanti’s
fiance´e Adriana is killed by Tony Soprano’s consigliere Silvio Dante because she had
been meeting with the FBI).
158. See Gilbert, supra note 153, at D1 (Carmela takes Tony back in return for a
$600,000 investment in a real estate venture); see also The Sopranos: Long-Term Parking,
supra note 157.
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committed a wrongful act159 or colluded in Tony’s crimes.  Meadow
is “not the wrongdoer.”  She also does not know the details of the
crimes Tony has committed.  Nonetheless, Meadow strongly sus-
pects Tony’s true occupation and eventually her suspicions have
been confirmed, at least in part.  There have been a lot of clues
over time.160  Yet, when Meadow asked Tony whether he is in the
Mafia, he lied to her and claimed to be in the “waste management
business.”161  Eventually, Tony admitted that “some of [his] money
. . . comes from illegal gambling,”162 but justified this conduct as
necessary to overcoming anti-Italian-American discrimination.163
In sum, Meadow has some knowledge of a small piece of Tony’s
criminal activity, but her knowledge of the scope and content of her
father’s activities is ambiguous or, at least, more ambiguous than
the state of Carmela’s knowledge.
Meadow differs from her mother in another fundamental re-
gard.  Meadow did not choose to be a Soprano.  None of us chooses
our parents.  It is an accident of birth for which she cannot be held
responsible.  Meadow’s circumstances are not the product of voli-
tion.  They result from serendipity.  In this significant way, Meadow
differs from both of her parents.  She did not actively pursue a life
of crime or the proceeds of crime.  Perhaps Meadow could have
159. See RUCKER, supra note 129, at ch. 9.  Again, this sentence may overstate the
case slightly.  Meadow has used illegal drugs and hosted a drug party at her grand-
mother’s empty house. See id. at ch. 9 (“a little party at my gramma’s old house got, you
know, a little whacky last nite.”).  But these transgressions are not part and parcel of the
Soprano crime family’s operations.
160. See, e.g., CHASE, supra note 153, at 77 (Meadow gives voice to her suspicions
during a college tour with her father, and explains why she is suspicious: police searches
of the Sopranos’ house, and finding Krugerrands and a gun while hunting for Easter
eggs); id. at 123-25 (on the college tour, during which Tony killed a mob informant,
Meadow notices his strange late-night behavior and phone calls from a pay phone, as
well as his bloody hand and scuffed shoes); see also infra note 172 (Meadow talking with
AJ about her father’s profession); see also infra note 175 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Scatino SUV incident). Meadow clearly communicates that she believes her sus-
picions have been confirmed when her erstwhile boyfriend Jackie Aprile, Jr. is
murdered. Meadow blamed her father and “the family life.” See Cast and Crew: Meadow
Soprano (played by Jamie-Lynn DiScala), at http://www.hbo.com/sopranos/cast/charac-
ter/meadow_soprano.shtml (last visited July 13, 2004).
161. See CHASE, supra note 153, at 77.
162. See id. at 78.  Of course, illegal gambling is only a small portion of the Soprano
crime family’s activities.
163. See id. at 91 (“There was a time . . . when the Italian people didn’t have a lot of
options. . . . I put food on the table.”).
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made the choice to escape her parents and their life.  During the
TV life of “The Sopranos,”  Meadow reached majority age and, at
that point, could have functionally divorced her parents.164  But
certainly before her eighteenth birthday, Meadow exercised no
choice with respect to her family.
For both of these reasons, Meadow more closely resembles the
white workers Justice Powell proclaimed were “not the wrongdoers”
than does Carmela.  Justice Powell’s “innocent” workers did not
themselves commit the discriminatory acts that required a remedy,
just as Meadow has committed no wrongful acts.  Like Meadow and
her father’s crimes, the white workers probably did not have precise
knowledge about the instrumentalities of their employers’ discrimi-
natory acts or the details of how they occurred.165
But, like Meadow, white workers in a discriminatory work envi-
ronment must suspect that something is amiss.  A white truck driver
with the most lucrative routes who looks around at his co-workers
and finds that all of the well-paid drivers are white, while the least
paid drivers and other low-wage workers are African-American or
Latino, must have doubts.166  A white teacher in a suburban school
district must wonder why she has very few African-Americans col-
leagues when the nearby city’s school district staffs half of its class-
rooms with African-American teachers.167  A white union member
could not have believed that a total absence of African-American
apprentices in his union is the product of pure happenstance when
the surrounding city has a sizable African-American population.168
Even without confirmed, precise knowledge, these purported “in-
nocents” certainly must have suspicions, just like Meadow.169
164. See The Sopranos: No Show, (HBO, Sept. 22, 2002), available at http://www.mob-
story.com/scripts/ep41.html (Meadow says, “I’m over 18 now, I’m a grown woman.  I
can go where I want and do what I want.”).
165. I disagree with Frances Ansley’s suggestion that “white victims are likely to be
at least partially complicit, rather than purely ‘innocent’. . . .”  Ansley, supra note 4, at
1058.  This assertion is not true in many circumstances and unnecessary to the conclu-
sion that white workers must return the proceeds of discrimination to its victims.
166. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324.
167. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
168. See Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
169. But see Mahoney, supra note 56, at 806-07 (“One of the privileges of whiteness
is a freedom not to notice privilege.”).
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Also, like Meadow and her family circumstances, most white
male workers were born into an American society where African-
Americans, women, and others were already subjected to discrimi-
nation.  Most white workers do not live in this society as a result of
choice.  The immigrants who made that choice probably did not
knowingly seek to avail themselves of the benefits of discrimination.
Theoretically, any American worker could leave the United States
and search for a discrimination-free society in which to live, just as
Meadow could have divorced her parents at the age of eighteen.
But a worker’s failure to emigrate is not the same as Carmela’s ac-
tive pursuit of the proceeds of crime.  It more closely resembles
Meadow’s conflicted and continuing, but passive, relationship with
her father and his business.
Like his sister Meadow, AJ Soprano is “not the wrongdoer.”  AJ
has never committed a criminal act or colluded in any of Tony’s
crimes.170  Also, like his sister, he does not know the details of
Tony’s crimes.  Like all of us, AJ did not choose his parents, so his
position is not the product of volition.  Further, AJ turned eighteen
only during the most recent TV season of The Sopranos, and so re-
mained a minor until very recently.171 Only in the most difficult
circumstances could he have escaped his gilded cage.  AJ and his
sister seem to be very similar.
There is, however, one apparently relevant difference between
AJ and his sister.  Meadow is very smart.  AJ is not.  As a result, AJ
does not have as much insight into Tony’s true occupation as does
his older sister.  He has had unmistakable hints from his sister and
others.172  But AJ does not seem to understand or, if he under-
170. See RUCKER, supra note 129, at ch. 9.
171. AJ turned thirteen during the pilot episode of The Sopranos and so, five seasons
later, he is a high-school senior and, most likely, eighteen years old. See CHASE, supra
note 153, at 7 (pilot episode); Dave Larsen, NUMBER FIVE WITH A BULLET: Violence,
Dark Humor Return With ‘Sopranos’ Fifth Season, THE DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 7, 2004, at
F1 (AJ is a high-school student).
172. For example, AJ challenged a classmate named Jeremy Piocosta to a fight over
some allegedly borrowed money.  When the time came for the fight, Jeremy backed out
and handed over the money AJ had demanded.  AJ was told that Jeremy backed out of
the fight because he was “scared.” When AJ asked Meadow for an explanation, she
mockingly asked: “You know any other garbage men who live in a house like this?  Un-
cle Jackie.  Why do we call him uncle when he’s not even related?  He’s in Dad’s other
family.” The Sopranos: Meadowlands (HBO, Jan. 31, 1999), available at http://www.sopra-
noland.com/episodes/ep04/transcript/index2.html. See also The Sopranos: Everybody
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stands, remains largely indifferent to, the import of all he has seen
and been told.  There are no infants in the Soprano family, but AJ
comes closest to the sleeping infant who exemplifies the broader,
moral definition of “innocence.”  Giving him every benefit of the
doubt, AJ does not know that his father has engaged in wrongful
acts to support his family.  AJ simply lives his life in a not-atypical
adolescent haze. Thus, AJ may be the only Soprano with a legiti-
mate claim to some similarity with the sleeping infant and the
moral power that status suggests.
2. Meadow, AJ, and the Supreme Court’s “Innocence”
Jurisprudence
With all of their differences from Carmela, Meadow and AJ
share their mother’s most important characteristic: Meadow and AJ
have benefited richly from Tony’s crimes.  Among other things,
they live in a nice suburban house, Meadow received a gift of a
sports utility vehicle from her father and attends an expensive Ivy
League university where Carmela paved her way with a generous
financial donation, and AJ eats all he wants, attends a private
school, and receives expensive gifts.173  This lifestyle is made possi-
ble by Tony’s wrongful acts.174  Meadow and AJ are living well off
the proceeds of Tony’s crimes, just like their mother.
It is here that the Supreme Court’s wielding of the sleeping
infant’s power to the benefit of mere “not the wrongdoers” faces its
most direct and difficult challenge.  Meadow and AJ are “not the
Hurts (HBO, Oct. 20, 2002), available at http://www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/sea-
son4/episode45.shtml (AJ’s girlfriend expresses her excitement at being “a gangster
dude’s girlfriend”); GABBARD, supra note 136, at 38 (AJ learns his father’s Uncle Junior
got arrested); id. at 153-54 (AJ notices federal agents at Jackie Aprile’s funeral).
173. See Sopranos May get an Offer They Can’t Refuse, supra note 152 (discussing the
value of the Sopranos’ suburban house); Columbia U. Gives The Sopranos a Pass for Using
Its Name All Season, NEW YORK OBSERVER, May 28, 2001, at 3 (discussing Meadow’s col-
lege and the Sopranos’ gift); see also GABBARD, supra note 136, at 128-29 (Meadow re-
sponds to Columbia’s solicitation of a $50,000 donation: “How corrupt!”); see infra note
175 (discussing Meadow’s SUV); RUCKER, supra note 129, at ch. 9 (AJ attended Verbum
Dei Middle School); The Sopranos: Two Tony’s (HBO, Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://
www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/season5/episode53.shtml (Tony buys AJ a $5,000
drum set); The Sopranos: All Happy Families (HBO, Mar. 28, 2004), available at http://
www.sopranoland.com/episodes/ep56 (Tony gives AJ a SUV).
174. See CHASE, supra note 153, at 191 (Tony says, “everything this family has came
from the work I do.”).
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wrongdoers,” and they did not actively pursue the proceeds of
crime with full knowledge of their source, but they undeniably pos-
sess the proceeds of crime.  Even if we concede that Meadow and AJ
are “innocent” according to Justice Powell’s narrow definition, is
their claim to the proceeds of their father’s crimes equivalent or
superior to a claim by the victims of Tony’s crimes from whom
money and other valuables have been stolen?  Should Meadow’s
lack of volition and lack of confirmed knowledge, and AJ’s lack of
volition and deeper lack of knowledge, make them immune from
any obligation to return the criminal proceeds that support their
comfortable lifestyle?  In other words, is it relevant that Meadow
and AJ can satisfy the narrower, “not guilty” definition of
“innocence”?
The Supreme Court must answer “yes,” if its “innocence” juris-
prudence can be taken seriously.  And this affirmative answer helps
to disclose how the Court has given greater protection to “inno-
cent” workers than their status justifies.  In the remedies cases, the
Court would likely analogize Meadow’s and AJ’s situation to a layoff
remedy.  Depriving Meadow and AJ of the proceeds of their father’s
crimes would effect a serious disruption of a lifestyle they expected
would continue without interruption.  Unlike job-seeking “inno-
cent” workers in the external labor market encountering a hiring
remedy, Meadow and AJ cannot move easily and costlessly to a new
family that would support them in the same lifestyle.  Unlike ad-
vancement-seeking “innocent” employees facing a promotions rem-
edy, Meadow and AJ cannot expect that an equally lucrative means
of support for their lifestyle will come along in a brief time.  The
power of “innocence” in the moderate form suggested by the reme-
dies cases would require that Meadow and AJ be permitted to retain
their father’s criminal proceeds.
Applying the lessons of the constitutional affirmative action
cases would lend even greater support to Meadow’s and AJ’s claim.
A court or other competent governmental authority would have to
adjudge the crime’s victims as such.  Since no such adjudication of
Tony’s crimes has yet occurred, Meadow and AJ are home free.  But
even if Tony were found guilty of a crime and the crime’s victims
were clearly identified by the court, Meadow and AJ would be re-
quired to return the money and goods stolen from these proven
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victims only if the return somehow benefited Meadow and AJ.  For
example, Meadow would be required to return classmate Eric Sca-
tino’s SUV — acquired by Tony through illegal gambling opera-
tions and extortion of Eric’s father175 — only if the vehicle’s return
would have resulted in Eric being willing to sustain his friendship
with Meadow and, perhaps, becoming Meadow’s boyfriend.  Thus,
“innocence” in the strongest form suggested by the constitutional
affirmative action cases would also permit Meadow and AJ to retain
their father’s criminal proceeds.
In the Title VII affirmative action cases, it might appear that
Meadow and AJ would be required to surrender the criminal pro-
ceeds they possess to their rightful owners.  No adjudication of
Tony’s guilt would be required.  Instead, a mere showing that
Meadow and AJ possess something that belonged to someone else
would be sufficient.  With that showing, Meadow and AJ would be
required to return the criminal proceeds as long as they did not
suffer a truly significant harm as a result.  For example, depriving
Meadow and AJ of all opportunities to acquire other sources of sup-
port for their lifestyle in the future might be a sufficiently signifi-
cant harm.  But no such remedy is required.  Meadow and AJ need
only disgorge the proceeds of Tony’s crimes and then go on with
their lives.
Even given the weak form of “innocence” it suggests, Title VII’s
affirmative action jurisprudence presents another obstacle to re-
quiring Meadow and AJ to return the proceeds of their father’s
crimes.  Title VII permits only voluntary affirmative action — that is,
affirmative action that is not imposed by government.176  Voluntary
affirmative action in this scenario would consist of Tony making the
uncoerced choice to return the proceeds of his crimes to his vic-
tims, including the money and goods he has conveyed to Meadow
and AJ.  The question would then become, does the power of “in-
nocence” prohibit Tony from voluntarily returning the proceeds to
their original owners?  This question certainly would not arise.
Tony’s character would not permit the return of anything he has
175. See id. at 189-91 (Tony gives Eric Scatino’s SUV to Meadow after receiving it in
payment for gambling debts from Eric’s father, but Meadow confronts Tony regarding
how he obtained the car); see also id. at 192-93 (Meadow and Eric argue about the car
and whose father is at fault).
176. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 200-08.
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stolen, particularly if it involved depriving his daughter or son of
anything at all.
If Meadow and AJ are analogous to the white and male “inno-
cent” workers of the workplace discrimination cases, then the
Sopranos metaphor suggests how powerful “innocence” has been in
the workplace discrimination cases and how it has affected the
Court’s decision making.  The “innocent” must be permitted to re-
tain the proceeds of wrongdoing in almost all cases because any
other outcome might cause harm to the “innocent.”  “Innocence”
vests workers with a superior claim to care and protection from the
law.
3. Innocence’s Irrelevance
The foregoing consideration of the Supreme Court’s “inno-
cence” jurisprudence helps to disclose how “innocence” produces
this excess of care and protection for “innocent” workers in the
workplace discrimination cases: Meadow’s and AJ’s circumstances
and expectations are considered in a vacuum.177  The power of “in-
nocence” causes courts to minimize the victim’s perspective.  Yet,
the victims of Tony’s crimes also had expectations.178  They cer-
tainly expected they would continue to enjoy their money and
goods without illegal interruption.  Further, they probably expected
that their money and goods would be returned to them if they were
taken illegally.  As a result, Meadow and AJ Soprano and the victims
of Tony’s crimes appear to have conflicting expectations which, if
considered only superficially, seem to support competing claims to
the law’s care and protection.
These superficially competing claims appear to present a di-
lemma of moral equivalence.  Why should courts value the discrimi-
nation victims’ expectations more than they value the expectations
of workers who are “not the wrongdoers”?  This problem becomes a
177. Although I do not discuss it here, there is also the troubling possibility that the
expectations of white and male workers are themselves rooted in racism and, therefore,
illegitimate and unworthy of any legal protection. See Harris, supra note 14, at 1777-78;
Ansley, supra note 4, at 1010-13.
178. I will ignore the possibility that the people from whom Tony has stolen and
extorted money are themselves criminals to avoid unnecessarily complicating this argu-
ment with facts that are not analogous to the workplace discrimination cases.
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dilemma,179 however, if and only if the background facts support-
ing these expectations are morally equivalent.  But they are not.
American society is not morally indifferent to the means by which
Meadow and AJ obtained the resources that support their lifestyle
and which they expect to retain, and it should not be morally indif-
ferent to the fact that white and male workers have received some
workplace benefits as a consequence of discrimination.
Society has a deep concern about how money and goods are
acquired.  The most obvious example is that the law strongly disfa-
vors individuals engaging in criminal acts to acquire money and
goods.  When an individual makes an acquisition through criminal
means, the criminal law usually takes away that individual’s wrong-
fully acquired money and property either by requiring the payment
of restitution to the victim, disgorgement of criminal proceeds to
the government, or financial penalty paid to the government.180
The law also strongly disfavors individuals engaging in tortious acts
that have the effect of depriving another person of something valu-
able.  When an injury has been wrongfully inflicted, tort law pro-
vides a mechanism for compensating the injured party.181  Because
society abhors the criminal means by which Tony acquires his liveli-
hood, Meadow’s and AJ’s claim to the proceeds of Tony’s crimes is
not equivalent to claims by the victims of Tony’s crimes.  Meadow
and AJ must return the proceeds of Tony’s crimes. Any assertions
that Meadow and AJ are “innocent” because they are “not the
wrongdoers” are and should be irrelevant.
This same principle applies to workplace discrimination and
the role of “innocence” in the three lines of cases discussed above.
179. I am fond of the following aphorism without knowing its source: “Problems
have solutions; this is a dilemma.”  I use “problem” and “dilemma” in this sentence to
suggest precisely this meaning.
180. See MANDATORY RESTITUTION ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2000) (federal law pro-
viding for restitution for crime victims); 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2000) (“A defendant who has
been found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine.”); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.9 (2003) (if the cost of remedial efforts is less than the gains
to the organization from an offense, disgorgement shall be added to the fine); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-3 (Supp. 2003) (New Jersey sentencing provisions that provide for
fines and restitution).
181. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (2000) (“The essence of tort is the
defendant’s potential for civil liability to the victim for harmful wrongdoing and corre-
spondingly the victim’s potential for compensation or other relief.”).
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Generalizing from observations by Chief Justice Burger for the Fulli-
love plurality,182 Justice Stevens in Martin v. Wilks,183 the Franks
Court,184 and simply accepting common sense and plain observa-
tion,185 white workers and male workers respectively have benefited
richly from discrimination against African-American workers and
women workers both by individual employers and society at large.
At a minimum, white and male workers benefit from more and bet-
ter job opportunities, higher pay, and greater competitive-type se-
niority which brings with it greater opportunities for good
occupational outcomes like promotions, recalls, and desirable as-
signments, and lesser susceptibility to bad occupational outcomes
like layoffs, undesirable assignments, and involuntary relocations.
White and male workers reap some of the proceeds of discrimina-
tion.  Like Meadow and AJ, they should be required to return these
ill-gotten gains as part of the process of remedying discrimination.
4. Pausing to Re-Consider the Sopranos Metaphor
A potentially important criticism of this essay’s analogy be-
tween the Sopranos and workplace discrimination requires a pre-
emptive response.  The Sopranos metaphor posits that the
proceeds of crime and discrimination are directly traceable from
their possessor to their source.  Tony steals money from a victim
and gives it to Meadow who has no other source of support; there-
fore, Meadow’s money is the victim’s money.  In the workplace dis-
crimination context, an employer discriminates against an African-
American worker by denying her a job to which she would other-
wise be entitled and hires a white worker instead; therefore, the
182. See supra text accompanying note 71.
183. 490 U.S. 755, 791-92 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The white respondents
in these cases are not responsible for that history of discrimination, but they are never-
theless beneficiaries of the discriminatory practices that the litigation was designed to
correct. Any remedy that seeks to create employment conditions that would have ob-
tained if there had been no violations of law will necessarily have an adverse impact on
whites, who must now share their job and promotion opportunities with blacks.  Just as
white employees in the past were innocent beneficiaries of illegal discriminatory prac-
tices, so is it inevitable that some of the same white employees will be innocent victims
who must share some of the burdens resulting from the redress of the past wrongs.”).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
185. See infra note 198 (generally discussing how whites have benefited from dis-
crimination against African-Americans).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR202.txt unknown Seq: 53 14-MAR-05 17:51
2004] INNOCENCE AND THE SOPRANOS 629
white worker’s job should have been the African-American worker’s
job.  This supposition about the proceeds of discrimination is sub-
ject to challenge and requires further explanation.
The analogy to the remedies cases works well.  Before a reme-
dies issue can arise, the court must make a liability determination
consisting of findings that identified victims have suffered  discrimi-
nation which deprived them of particular workplace benefits that
were given to others.186  The analogy to affirmative action, however,
is subject to two challenges.  One criticism would attack the analogy
drawn between the victims of Tony Soprano’s crimes and the bene-
ficiaries of affirmative action.  As noted above, some critics charge
that affirmative action benefits workers who are not themselves the
victims of discrimination.  This criticism would suggest that affirma-
tive action benefits the progeny of the victims of discrimination or,
in some cases, workers without any relationship to past discrimina-
tion victims; therefore, the proper analogy would be drawn to the
children of Tony’s victims or members of their generation unre-
lated to the crime victims.
This first criticism is overbroad.  In some cases, workplace af-
firmative action benefits workers who are themselves the victims of
discrimination that cannot be remedied through other means.  In
the public sector, affirmative action may be the only remedy availa-
ble to workers who have suffered from discrimination, but cannot
prove that their governmental employer discriminated intention-
ally.187  Even in the private sector, affirmative action may remedy
186. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (discuss-
ing the prima facie case for a disparate treatment claim — “The complainant in a Title
VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1989) (setting forth the prima facie case for “mixed
motive” cases); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (codifying and modifying Price
Waterhouse); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000) (setting forth the prima facie case for dispa-
rate impact claims).
187. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (a test which is neutral on its
face and with a neutral rationale may be said to serve a purpose the Government is
constitutionally empowered to pursue, even though there may be a disproportionate
impact upon African-Americans).
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discriminatory acts born of unconscious racism and sexism that can-
not be reached through the traditional anti-discrimination tools of
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.188  In many cases,
therefore, affirmative action serves to eradicate discrimination.
The beneficiaries of affirmative action, who are also the victims of
discrimination, occupy a position analogous to Tony Soprano’s
victims.
In some cases, however, the beneficiaries of workplace affirma-
tive action may not have been directly victimized by the discrimina-
tory acts of an employer or prospective employer.  Instead,
workplace affirmative action may redress the present effects of the
employer’s past behavior.  For example, affirmative action may seek
to induce African-Americans or women to seek employment in a
skilled job category that has been traditionally segregated because
prior generations of African-Americans or women were either pro-
hibited or discouraged from seeking the skilled jobs themselves and
even the skills needed to obtaining those jobs.189  In these circum-
stances, the proceeds of discrimination stolen from an earlier gen-
eration of African-Americans or women are being returned to a
later generation through affirmative action.  Thus, the beneficiaries
of affirmative action should not stand in the place of Tony’s crime
victims; rather, they are more closely analogous to the children or
grandchildren of Tony’s crime victims.
188. CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING
THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 77-80 (1997) (describing how most behavior that
produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation and the
courts have done little to address our continuing racial issues by “tout[ing] a legal ideol-
ogy of ‘formal equality’” that is equal in theory but not in fact and whose effect “makes
it possible to pretend that racism does not exist.”).
189. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99 (“Until 1974, Kaiser hired as craftworkers for that
plant only persons who had had prior craft experience. Because blacks had long been
excluded from craft unions, few were able to present such credentials. As a conse-
quence, prior to 1974 only 1.83% (5 out of 273) of the skilled craftworkers at the Gra-
mercy plant were black, even though the work force in the Gramercy area was
approximately 39% black.”); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1987)
(“Furthermore, women working at the Agency were concentrated largely in EEOC job
categories traditionally held by women . . . none of the 238 Skilled Craft Worker posi-
tions was held by a woman . . . this underrepresentation of women in part reflected the
fact that women had not traditionally been employed in these positions, and that they
had not been strongly motivated to seek training or employment in them.”).
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This criticism has a further logical extension: the proceeds of
the employer’s past discrimination did not flow to the white or male
co-workers of affirmative action’s beneficiaries.  Rather, these pro-
ceeds flowed in the first instance to the white and male contempo-
raries of the earlier generation of African-Americans and women
who were victimized by the employer’s discrimination.  For exam-
ple, the skilled jobs which the African-American and women work-
ers of an earlier generation did not get went to their white and
male co-workers.  As a result, the “innocent” co-workers of affirma-
tive action’s beneficiaries, because they have not directly benefited
from discrimination, are not analogous to Meadow and AJ.  Rather,
they are more like Meadow’s and AJ’s children or grandchildren.
Taken in tandem, these two sides of the same criticism suggest
that the proper question in some number of affirmative action
cases is not whether the proceeds of discrimination should be taken
from Meadow and AJ and returned to Tony’s victims.  Instead, the
question is whether the “return all ill-gotten gains” principle should
require Tony Soprano’s grandchildren to return whatever proceeds
of Tony’s crimes they may possess to the grandchildren of Tony’s
victims.
For the purposes of this essay, the best answer is that “inno-
cence” does not provide us with an answer.  The children and
grandchildren of the beneficiaries of workplace discrimination are
no more “innocent” than their forebears, if “innocence” as defined
by Justice Powell even has degrees.  Contemporaneity is not synony-
mous with guilt any more than the passage of time assures greater
moral purity.  To the contrary, this essay accepts the basic premise
of the Supreme Court’s “innocence” jurisprudence that all of these
workers — past and present — are “not the wrongdoers.”  Thus,
the current generation of “innocent” workers is no more entitled to
keep the proceeds of discrimination solely on the strength of their
“innocence” than were their forebears.  On these grounds, this criti-
cism offers a distinction without a difference.  These “innocent”
workers are similarly situated to Meadow and AJ, at least with re-
spect to their “innocence.”  The concern with applying the “return
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all ill-gotten gains” principle in these circumstances must have
other sources.190
A second criticism would strike at drawing an analogy between
the employer and Tony Soprano in the affirmative action context.
More precisely, in some cases, the beneficiaries of affirmative action
were victimized by discrimination, but the discriminator was not
their employer or prospective employer.  Disparate workplace out-
comes for African-Americans, Latinos, and whites, or for men and
women, may be the product of discrimination in the education sys-
tem or the economic system, or other aspects of society that are
beyond the employer’s control.  If the employer is not the wrong-
doer, this criticism would suggest, then the employer is not analo-
gous to Tony Soprano, since he is undeniably the wrongdoer in the
Sopranos metaphor.
This criticism can be easily dismissed.  The identity of discrimi-
nation’s perpetrator matters not at all, just as the identity of the
perpetrator of a crime does not matter to the question of whether a
crime’s proceeds must be returned to its victim.  If Paulie “Wal-
nuts,” a member of Tony Soprano’s crew,191 gave Meadow or AJ the
proceeds of his crimes, Meadow’s and AJ’s obligation to return
those criminal proceeds would not be any less than if the proceeds
had come from Tony.  The same can be said about workplace dis-
crimination.  It does not matter who stands in Tony Soprano’s place
— the perpetrator’s place — in this analogy.  It may be a particular
employer, society as a whole, or an identifiable group of societal
actors such as educational systems.  The analogy succeeds as long as
there is one discriminator (or more) taking something valuable
190. Some of these other sources of concern are addressed below.  For example, an
implausible argument might be advanced that the white and male workers of today
have not benefited from past discrimination.  But the evidence required to support an
employer’s resort to affirmative action would disprove this argument, at least with re-
spect to a particular workplace. See infra Part III.C.5.C.  Further, an argument could be
made that, even if the modern generation of workers may have benefited in some man-
ner from past discrimination, it is impossible to trace the proceeds of prior acts of
discrimination to their modern possessors and, therefore, impossible to know what (or,
perhaps, how much) should be returned to whom.  It is worth noting that this argu-
ment presents a problem of proof unrelated to “innocence.” Also, it concedes that “in-
nocent” workers possess some proceeds of discrimination which is sufficient to trigger
the “return all ill-gotten gains” principle. See infra note 198.
191. See RUCKER, note 129, at ch. 8.
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from one group (i.e., African-Americans, women workers) and de-
livering it to another (i.e., white workers, male workers).  That valu-
able something must be returned.
5. Preemptive Responses to Criticisms of the “Return
All Ill-Gotten Gains” Principle
Drawing analogies between a society and employers that dis-
criminate and white or male workers who benefit from that discrim-
ination, on the one hand, and Tony Soprano and Meadow Soprano
(and to a lesser extent AJ), on the other hand, also invites criticisms
of the “return all ill-gotten gains” principle.  This sub-section will
suggest several non-trivial criticisms of the principle and seek to re-
spond to them in a manner that further discloses the role of “inno-
cence” in the workplace discrimination cases.
a. Punishment vs. Ill-Gotten Gains
The first criticism would begin with the normative assertion
that Tony’s crimes are worse than any employer’s discriminatory
act.  Building on this normative judgment, this argument would
suggest that serious offenders deserve harsh treatment while less
egregious offenders should suffer lesser punishments; therefore,
Tony’s crimes should be punished more severely than should work-
place discrimination.  Further, “innocent” workers who have, by
definition, not committed any wrongdoing, should not be punished
at all.
One response to this criticism might challenge the normative
premise that all of Tony’s crimes are worse than all workplace dis-
crimination.  While there is certainly no workplace discrimination
analog to murder, an argument might be constructed that some
cases of employment discrimination occupy the same moral plain as
theft, fraud, or extortion.  Yet, entering into this unendingly con-
troversial normative argument might not be necessary.  It also may
not adequately address the problem that white and male workers
have not necessarily played any role in an employer’s discrimina-
tion beyond benefiting from it.
An alternative response would disclose a problematic, yet es-
sential, premise underlying this first criticism: returning ill-gotten
gains is not “punishment.”  Requiring Meadow and AJ, and the
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white and male “innocents” in the workplace discrimination cases,
to return the proceeds of crime and discrimination which they re-
spectively possess is not “punishment.”  This essay’s argument con-
cedes the assumption heavily relied upon in the Supreme Court’s
“innocence” jurisprudence that Meadow, AJ, and the “innocent”
workers have done nothing wrong and, therefore, should not be
punished.192  While true, this point is irrelevant to the larger ques-
tion of whether the Court has wielded the power of “innocence”
fairly and appropriately.
Meadow, AJ, and the “innocent” workers possess valuables that
belong to someone else.  Meadow, AJ, and the “innocent” workers
have never had and cannot acquire a property interest in these pro-
ceeds of others’ criminal and civil wrongs, respectively.193  Taking
these proceeds from Meadow, AJ, and the “innocent” workers does
not unsettle vested interests.  Rather, it merely restores property to
its rightful owners.  As a result, the suggestion that Tony Soprano
deserves worse punishment than the employment discriminator,
and that “innocents” deserve no punishment at all, proves to be
irrelevant to this argument. The criticism fails because its premise is
flawed.
This first criticism may help explain “innocence’s” role in the
workplace discrimination cases.  The Court’s invocation of “inno-
cence” obfuscates the important distinction between “punishment”
and “returning ill-gotten gains.”  “Innocents” cannot be justifiably
punished.  But an argument can be made, as in this essay, that im-
properly obtained money and other items of value should be re-
turned.  The Supreme Court’s “innocence” jurisprudence avoids
the difficult questions of whether and when “innocents” may be
properly allowed to keep the proceeds of discrimination.  The
Court might have constructed an argument to support its apparent
conclusion, implied in the workplace discrimination cases, that “in-
192. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text; see also Sullivan, supra note 5, at
93-95 (explaining that affirmative action need not be viewed either as “punishment” or
“compensation to past victims,” but as an acknowledgment that discrimination pro-
duces windfalls that should be returned).
193. See generally 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 34 (1997) (“The theft of goods or chat-
tels does not divest one who owns, or has title to, such property from his or her owner-
ship of the property.”).  This proposition is subject to limitation by the bona fide
purchaser for value principle. See infra text accompanying notes 194-96.
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nocents” should rarely, if ever, be required to return the proceeds
of discrimination.  Of course, the Court has never offered such an
argument.  Instead, the Court has used “innocence” to hide incom-
plete judicial reasoning justifying unjust results.
b. When Might “Innocents” Keep Ill-Gotten Gains?
A second criticism would suggest a direct answer to the ques-
tion which the Supreme Court’s “innocence” jurisprudence has
steadfastly avoided.  This argument would suggest that some cir-
cumstances exist in which the possessors of ill-gotten gains should be
permitted to keep the proceeds of others’ wrongdoing.  In other
words, the “return all ill-gotten gains” principle, in its purest form,
goes too far.  Two circumstances might support this criticism: cir-
cumstances analogous to property law’s “bona fide purchasers for
value” concept, and situations in which the “innocent” party’s own
property is inextricably mixed with ill-gotten gains.
A “bona fide purchaser for value” makes a good-faith purchase
of real property by exchanging fair value for the property without
actual or constructive notice of any infirmities, claims, or equities
against the title.194  Bona fide purchasers generally must have no
suspicions about competing interests which would inspire a pru-
dent person to make further inquiry.195  If so, then the bona fide
purchaser takes title to the purchased property “free and clear” of
hidden claims or title defects.196
Meadow, AJ, and the “innocent” white and male workers could
not claim a bona fide purchaser’s status.  Obviously, they are not
buying real property.  But more generally, they are not “purchas-
ers” exchanging fair value for the proceeds of crime and discrimi-
nation respectively.  They have given no consideration in return for
the proceeds of wrongdoing.  White and male workers receive bet-
ter jobs, higher wages, and more opportunities because they are
white or male and, for these reasons alone, benefit from discrimina-
tion.197  They exchange their labor only for the benefits they would
194. See generally RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01[2][b]
(Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2004) (offering a general definition of “bona fide purchaser”
for value).
195. Id. at § 82.01[3].
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., supra notes 33-34 and text accompanying notes 182-84.
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have received absent discrimination, and not the windfall gener-
ated by their employers’ or society’s discriminatory acts.  Similarly,
these workers’ progeny — that is, the co-workers of the benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action — cannot claim to have given consider-
ation in exchange for any benefits they have derived from
discrimination.198  Meadow and AJ Soprano live well off the pro-
ceeds of their father’s crimes only because of the serendipity of
birth.  They have given no new consideration to their father in re-
turn for the proceeds of his crimes.  There is also good reason to
doubt that either Meadow (and perhaps, but less certainly, AJ) or
the white and male workers, or even their progeny, could satisfy the
requirement that they harbor no suspicions or, perhaps more pre-
cisely, should not be charged with constructive notice that they are
the beneficiaries of discrimination.199 Thus, the bona fide pur-
chaser concept does not undermine the “return all ill-gotten gains”
principle in its instant application.  It is inapposite.
It is fair to ask, however, whether the “return all ill-gotten
gains” principle should apply to workers whose circumstances are
more closely analogous to the bona fide purchaser for value.  Modi-
fying the Sopranos metaphor, once again, will help to illustrate.
Imagine that Meadow hires a housekeeper to clean her New York
City apartment.  The housekeeper diligently and thoroughly cleans
the apartment.  Meadow pays her with a $50 bill for each cleaning.
Of course, since Meadow has no other source of income, each $50
bill comes from the proceeds of Tony Soprano’s crimes which he
has, in turn, conveyed to Meadow.  Yet, the housekeeper has ex-
changed fifty dollars’ worth of honest labor in return for each $50
bill without any reason to suspect its source.  Thus, she can draw a
198. For example, contemporary white workers’ families probably experienced bet-
ter economic outcomes (e.g., wealth, home ownership, skills acquisition) than did the
families of discrimination victims because of unrestricted job and educational opportu-
nities, among other factors.  These superior economic and social positions may have, in
turn, provided them with networks of professional contacts and role models which, in
turn, produced substantially improved job prospects.  Contemporary white workers may
benefit from the better educational opportunities that result from either greater wealth
or the lasting effects of de facto and de jure housing discrimination which put them in
wealthier school districts. See, e.g., MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH 50-52 (1995).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
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clean analogy between her situation and the bona fide purchaser
for value.
Should the housekeeper be required to return the $50 bill to
the victims of Tony’s crimes, as the “return all ill-gotten gains” prin-
ciple seems to suggest?  This issue reduces to the question of which
party — the victims of Tony’s crimes or the housekeeper — should
bear the risk that a claim against Tony or Meadow will fail.  If the
housekeeper must surrender her $50 bill to Tony’s victims, then
the housekeeper has a legitimate claim against Meadow for $50 of
compensation.  If the housekeeper is permitted to keep the $50
bill, then Tony’s victims have a legitimate claim against Tony for
$50 of restitution.  Should each of these claims succeed, the ques-
tion of whether the “return all ill-gotten gains” principle applies to
the housekeeper’s case is moot.  The housekeeper and the crime
victims would each get their $50 by some means.  If either claim
could fail, however, or if either Tony or Meadow could not pay $50
to the housekeeper or the crime victims, then the principle’s appli-
cability to the housekeeper’s situation becomes most important.
Fortunately, the argument in this essay does not depend upon
making this Hobson’s choice between Tony’s victims and the
housekeeper.  It does not seem likely, apart from the “mixed prop-
erty” circumstances discussed below, that any white or male co-
worker of a discrimination victim will be able to legitimately claim a
status analogous to the housekeeper’s position.  Even if such a
white or male co-worker could be found, however, for the purposes
of this essay, it is sufficient that the housekeeper’s “innocence” does
not decide the question of whether she must return the $50 bills
which are  ill-gotten gains.  Like Meadow, the housekeeper is “not
the wrongdoer.”  But the housekeeper’s “innocence” is not suffi-
cient, even if it is not entirely irrelevant.  The provision of the
housekeeper’s labor — that is, her arms’ length exchange of some-
thing valuable for something of equal value — is the characteristic
which gives the housekeeper a claim that might compete with the
victims’ claims.  We can acknowledge that the bona fide purchaser
for value concept might limit the “return all ill-gotten gains” princi-
ple without also conceding that  “innocence” defines those limits.
It does not.
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A slightly different modification to the Sopranos metaphor
suggests another possible limitation of the “return all ill-gotten
gains” principle.  Imagine that Meadow has completed her bache-
lor of arts degree at Columbia University.  Again, Meadow has no
other means of support; therefore, we are safe in assuming that
Meadow’s tuition was paid entirely from the proceeds of Tony’s
crimes.  Unlike a parcel of real property, however, something more
than money is typically required to acquire a college degree.
Meadow must also have successfully completed Columbia Univer-
sity’s degree requirements to the satisfaction of her professors.
These requirements presumably include a long list of intellectually
challenging tasks of various types.  Thus, Meadow’s college degree
is the product of both the proceeds of Tony Soprano’s crimes and
Meadow’s honest educational labors.  In other words, Meadow’s le-
gitimate interest in her diploma and the ill-gotten gains are mixed.
Should Meadow be required to surrender her college degree
as part of the proceeds of her father’s crimes?200  Any honest an-
swer would have to acknowledge that the “return all ill-gotten
gains” principle does not decide this case.  A court order directing
Tony and Meadow to return every penny Tony had stolen from his
victims would not reach the portion of Meadow’s college diploma
that is the product of her honest work.  Meadow’s school work is
not an ill-gotten gain.  It never belonged to Tony’s victims.  It did
not belong to Tony.  It is Meadow’s property, and Meadow’s prop-
erty alone.  Of course, there is a complicating factor.  As a practical
matter, a court cannot return the ill-gotten portions of the
Meadow’s college diploma to Tony’s victims and leave Meadow to
enjoy the honestly produced portions.  A diploma simply cannot be
disaggregated in this way.  A Solomonic judge might cut the di-
ploma in half, but this solution adds little more than another meta-
phor involving infants.
Analogous circumstances may well arise in workplace discrimi-
nation cases.  White and male workers’ promotions, wages, and job
opportunities may be the products, at least in part, of their honest
labor and superior job performance or skill and, therefore, utterly
independent of discrimination and its effects.  To the extent that
200. For obvious reasons, I am dispensing with the inconvenient fact that college
diplomas ordinarily are not transferable.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR202.txt unknown Seq: 63 14-MAR-05 17:51
2004] INNOCENCE AND THE SOPRANOS 639
this is true, some portion of the workplace benefits awarded to
white and male workers are not ill-gotten gains.  They are mixed.
Like Meadow, these workers have a legitimate argument that their
workplace benefits  need not be surrendered even under the most
unadulterated application of the “return all ill-gotten gains” princi-
ple.  Similarly, the progeny of discrimination’s beneficiaries may
well believe that all of the wealth they have accumulated is the
product of their own “merit,” rather than the proceeds of discrimi-
nation.  Thus, they would view affirmative action as depriving them
of something they have earned, rather than the return of ill-gotten
gains.201
There are two answers to this argument.  First, and most impor-
tant to the central issue in this essay, “innocence” does not decide
the white and male workers’ claim to retain the proceeds of their
honest labor.  The fact that they are “not the wrongdoers” is not
sufficient to allow the just resolution of these difficult cases.
Rather, the independent fact that these workers’ honest labor con-
tributed to the workplace benefits they possess gives these workers a
claim which might compete with the discrimination victims’ de-
mands for those same benefits.  Unlike the bona fide purchaser for
value concept, this argument does not limit the “return all ill-gotten
gains” principle.  Instead, it reinforces the background principle
that all parties should be entitled to keep what is legitimately theirs.
“Innocence” is irrelevant.
Second, employment discrimination law suggests a rule that
can be used to resolve disputes of this sort.  When assessing the
liability of an employer that acted on both legitimate and discrimi-
natory motives — that is, “mixed motive” cases — a court will in-
quire into whether discriminatory intent played “a motivating part”
in the employer’s decision.202  If discriminatory intent was a moti-
201. See, e.g., DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: WHERE DO
WE GO FROM HERE? 56-57 (1996) (“It is generally assumed that white men are the major
victims of affirmative-preference programs. In one poll, 10 percent of white males said
that they felt they had lost a promotion because of quotas.  Almost every white man who
has looked for a job as a college professor since 1975 has been a victim of affirmative
preference.”).
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for an employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated this practice.”). This provision of the 1991 Civil Rights Act codi-
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vating factor, then the employer may avoid certain damages by
demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent its
discriminatory motive.203
This “same decision” defense suggests a rule that will help
courts decide how to treat legitimate interests and ill-gotten gains
that are mixed.  White and male workers should be allowed to re-
tain any workplace benefits to which they would have been entitled
absent discrimination.204  Similarly, any workplace benefits derived
from discrimination, including benefits passed from one genera-
tion to another, are ill-gotten gains that must be returned.  In
Meadow’s case, the question should be whether Columbia Univer-
sity would have conferred a college degree on her absent the ill-
gotten gains used to pay her tuition.  Although a difficult thought
exercise, this rule is familiar to courts considering employment dis-
crimination cases and it clearly informs the parties regarding what
must be proved.  The question of who bears what evidentiary bur-
den should, again, follow the existing rule of the same decision de-
fense.  Because discrimination is the understood and expected
background condition, the proponent of the view that the work-
place benefits were not tainted by discrimination should bear the
burden.205
fied the rule proposed in the plurality’s opinion in Hopkins, 490 U.S. at  250 (plurality
opinion). See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (holding that Con-
gress adopted the plurality’s rule in Hopkins when it enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act).
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000) (court may grant injunctive or declaratory
relief, and shall not order damages, if “respondent demonstrates that [he] would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor”).  This
rule applies to claims brought under Title VII because of a legislative amendment con-
tained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2000), but not necessarily to claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act because they were not similarly
amended.  In Hopkins, this “same decision” defense was a defense to liability. Hopkins,
490 U.S. at 244-45.
204. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at  285-86 (discussing a rule
similar to the “same decision” defense in determining a plaintiff’s rightful position).
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000) (after the complainant proves a violation,
respondent must “demonstrate[ ] that [he] would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor”).  “Demonstrate,” as used in Title VII,
means to bear the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(m) (2000).
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c. The Adjudication Criticism
The final criticism arises out of this essay’s reliance on criminal
law and tort law to support the argument that Meadow and AJ
would be required to return the proceeds of Tony’s crimes and, by
analogy, that “innocent” workers should be required to return the
proceeds of discrimination.  This criticism would rely on the unde-
niable fact that both criminal law and tort law would require
Meadow and AJ to return the proceeds of their father’s crimes only
after Tony’s guilt or liability had been finally adjudicated.  Thus,
drawing an analogy between workplace discrimination and criminal
and tort law appears to suggest that the “innocent” workers of the
workplace discrimination cases should not be required to yield the
benefits of their employers’ and society’s discrimination absent a
judicial determination that discrimination has, in fact, occurred.
An adjudication requirement would not undermine this essay’s
analysis of the remedies cases because, by definition, an employer
must have been adjudicated liable for workplace discrimination
before it can be subjected to a remedial order.  Affirmative action,
however, typically does not involve any formal adjudication of liabil-
ity.  Affirmative action generally arises out of the voluntary act of an
employer, or an employer and union engaged in collective bargain-
ing, or the political branches of government.  Courts intervene only
after the fact when considering a challenge by an allegedly ag-
grieved “innocent.”
This final criticism — the “adjudication criticism” — poses a
serious challenge to this essay’s critique of the affirmative action
cases.  The adjudication criticism also appears to justify the require-
ment imposed in the constitutional affirmative action cases that a
competent governmental entity acting within the scope of its au-
thority propound evidence of actual discrimination to support any
public-sector affirmative action plan.  It may even suggest that the
Title VII affirmative action cases are wrongly decided because they
do not require any governmental entity to find discrimination
before an employer may voluntarily engage in affirmative action.
A preliminary response to this adjudication criticism would
note that it offers no support to the powerful, almost irrebuttable,
presumption at work in the constitutional affirmative action cases
that the victims of discrimination and their co-workers should be
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treated as moral equivalents.206  Tort law provides no analogous
presumption.  Criminal law fosters a presumption of the defen-
dant’s innocence that has equivalent power.  But the innocence
presumption in criminal law is the product of our democracy’s fun-
damental interest in creating an effective check on the govern-
ment’s power to deprive accused citizens of their liberty.  There is
no equivalent policy interest justifying a presumption that discrimi-
nation does not exist in our society.207  The only purported policy
interest supporting this presumption would be in sustaining a pre-
tense that our society is both color-blind and gender-blind and,
therefore, does not need affirmative action.  Pretense hardly makes
for legitimate policy.
But this initial response leaves the adjudication criticism stand-
ing, at least in weaker form.  Even tort law, lacking any presump-
tion, requires some formal adjudication of liability before
restitution may be ordered.  This weaker criticism would still sug-
gest that affirmative action of any kind should be permitted only
after a court has found evidence of discrimination in need of
remedy.
Even in its weaker form, the adjudication criticism does not
sufficiently respect the evidence that justifies employers resorting to
affirmative action.  Employers voluntarily engaging in affirmative
action have determined that their workplaces foster “manifest im-
balances in traditionally segregated job classifications.”208  In other
words, the employer can amass direct evidence that white or male
workers have received jobs, job opportunities, promotions, or other
benefits of the workplace over an extended period of time which,
under ordinary and fair circumstances, would have gone to African-
Americans or women.  This is direct evidence that white or male
workers possess property which belongs to someone else, even if
this maldistribution was the product of discrimination in the past.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 75-88.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
208. An employer would have to be prepared to offer evidence of this fact in the
event their plans are challenged by white or male workers under Title VII. See supra
notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussion of Weber and Johnson) Under Title VII,
the employee challenging an affirmative action plan bears the burden of persuasion on
this question; however, the employer would almost certainly offer some evidence to
satisfy a burden of production on these questions. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626-27 (dis-
cussing employee’s burden of persuasion).
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Employers’ evidence that workplace benefits are maldis-
tributed need not support an inference that this “manifest imbal-
ance” is the product of discriminatory intent,209 but our
background understanding of discrimination’s pervasiveness and
power generally supports such an inference.210  Further, under Ti-
tle VII, the employer must guard against “unnecessary trammeling”
of white or male workers’ interests or the creation of an “absolute
bar” to these workers’ advancement.  This evidence that the em-
ployer has constructed its affirmative action plan narrowly negates
any suggestion that the employer is motivated by animus against
white people and/or men and, in turn, further supports the conclu-
sion that the employer created its affirmative action plan only to
remedy a discriminatory distribution of workplace benefits.
With direct evidence in hand that white or male workers pos-
sess something that rightfully belongs to someone else, probably as
a result of their employer’s or society’s intentional or unconscious
discriminatory act or practice, and lacking any evidence that the
employer’s decision to re-distribute those ill-gotten gains to their
rightful owners is motivated by discriminatory animus against white
people or men, the question becomes why an employer should be
forced to obtain judicial pre-approval for its affirmative action plan.
The likeliest argument in favor of subjecting affirmative action
plans to judicial pre-certification is that white and male workers
should be protected from the risk either that the employer does not
have any evidence or that the evidence is insufficient to justify an
affirmative action plan. This argument presupposes that white and
male workers will be temporarily deprived of some workplace bene-
fit and, therefore, suffer some harm during the period between the
employer’s implementation of the affirmative action plan and a
court’s final adjudication of the legitimacy of the affirmative action
plan.  Assuming away temporary injunctive relief during the pen-
dency of the challenge to the affirmative action plan, and the equal
likelihood that the employer would suspend operation of its sub
judice plan to avoid the imposition of excessive damages should it
lose, a possibility of temporary harm to white and male workers
remains.
209. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussion of “arguable violation”).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 21, 33-34, 72, 84-85, and notes 183, 198.
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There is, however, a far more powerful argument against judi-
cial pre-certification.  Litigation introduces sometimes substantial
transaction costs into the employer’s calculation about whether to
go forward with an affirmative action plan.211  As Ronald Coase
might have explained, higher transaction costs very likely would re-
sult in fewer employers engaging in affirmative action and, there-
fore, fewer proceeds of discrimination being returned to
discrimination’s victims.212  Thus, the likeliest consequence of judi-
cial pre-clearance of voluntary affirmative action plans, when post
hoc challenges are available, would be to increase the likelihood
that the ill effects of discrimination will remain undisturbed.
Thus, a choice is presented regarding which risk is more ac-
ceptable: the slight risk of a small and temporary harm to certain
white and male workers should an affirmative action plan be wrong-
fully adopted or the risk that some employers will not choose to
adopt affirmative action plans and thereby fail to remedy the stub-
born effects of discrimination.  The Supreme Court has interpreted
Title VII as reflecting a congressional judgment erring in favor of
eliminating discrimination and its vestiges by allowing only post hoc
challenges to affirmative action plans.  Yet, the Court has made a
very different choice through its interpretation of the Constitution.
The Court could have required governmental entities that un-
dertake voluntary affirmative action efforts to validate their affirma-
tive action plans using the same evidence Title VII requires of
private-sector employers: a manifest imbalance in traditionally seg-
regated classifications and no unnecessary trammeling on “in-
nocents’” interests or “absolute bars” to their advancement while
trying to achieve balance in the workforce.  This evidence would
support the inference that the governmental entity had undertaken
affirmative action to return the proceeds of discrimination to its
victims.  Yet, the Court has imposed a much higher burden on gov-
ernment when it seeks to implement affirmative action.  Although
not quite judicial pre-clearance, the Court has dictated both the
process by which the political branches must arrive at their deci-
211. See Harris, supra note 48, at 1191-92 (explaining how high transaction costs
can frustrate otherwise efficient deals).
212. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET AND THE LAW 114-19 (1998).
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sions regarding affirmative action and, to a large extent, what the
content of those decisions must be in order to pass constitutional
muster.
Public-sector affirmative action discloses how courts justify play-
ing a substantial and invasive role in their self-defined capacity as
neutral protectors of “innocents,” even when the political branches
of government have legislated based on sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that an affirmative action program serves a legitimate
purpose and is not the product of discriminatory animus against
the purported “innocents.” Thus, the adjudication criticism dis-
closes important, if subtle, aspects of the power of “innocence.”
The Supreme Court has made public-sector affirmative action sub-
stantially less likely by piling obstacles and attendant transaction
costs in the way of the political branches of government.  Like em-
ployers, governmental bodies are less likely to take an action if the
cost of taking the action is substantially increased.  The Court has
thereby made a policy choice that society should not risk affecting
white and male workers even if the cost is substantial harm to the
African-American and female victims of discrimination.
In sum, Meadow and AJ Soprano have helped us to understand
both the irrelevance of “innocence” to the merits of decisions about
remedies for workplace discrimination and the true role of “inno-
cence” in the workplace discrimination cases.  “Innocence,” de-
fined properly and precisely, should not decide whether
discrimination in the workplace is remedied and how.  The princi-
ple that all ill-gotten gains of discrimination must be returned of-
fers a better starting place for a just rule, although some limitations
and caveats may apply.  A further debate might suggest other limita-
tions, variations, and modifications.  But the debate would start with
a different premise than “innocence.”  Rather than assuming that
remedying discrimination deprives white and male workers of their
legitimately earned interests, it would assume instead that discrimi-
nation has misallocated workplace burdens and benefits.  Thus,
government’s role would not be to protect the interests of those
who have not suffered discrimination, but to reallocate workplace
burdens and benefits in a fair way.
Instead, the Supreme Court has avoided an honest debate over
the nature and power of “innocence.”  It has employed the power
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implicit in one definition of “innocence” in cases where a different,
narrower definition better fits the facts.  As a result of the Court’s
bait-and-switch, “innocence” has been a tool of obfuscation and ju-
dicial supremacy.  “Innocence” has allowed the Court to gloss over
the important difference between “punishment” and “returning ill-
gotten gains” and thereby cast the victims of discrimination as per-
petrators unjustly stealing benefits earned by their co-workers.  “In-
nocence” has been a proxy, if not a cover, for the Court arrogating
to itself the power to impose its policy choice — a choice in direct
conflict with evidence-supported decisions by the political branches
— that workers who have not faced discrimination (i.e., white and
male workers) should be allowed to keep the proceeds of discrimi-
nation.213  “Innocence” has allowed the Court to sustain a status
quo that leaves social and economic inequalities produced by dis-
crimination in place without taking responsibility for its choice.
And “innocence” has hidden the fact that the Court has imposed its
choice in the absence of any clear grant of constitutional or statu-
tory authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s “innocence” jurisprudence amounts to an a fortiori
argument: white and male workers are “innocent”; therefore, they
cannot be required to return property or interests derived from dis-
crimination.  But there is “innocence” and there is “innocence.”
The Supreme Court’s workplace discrimination cases have implic-
itly evoked the sleeping infant — the paradigmatic “innocent” — to
justify strictly limiting the remedies allowed to the victims of dis-
crimination.  Yet, the “innocents” being protected by the Court can-
not be fairly analogized to the sleeping infant.  They are merely
“not the wrongdoers.”  This essay expressly invoked television mob-
ster Tony Soprano and his family to examine what it means when
workers are “not the wrongdoers” and how much care and protec-
tion they are owed because they can satisfy this narrow definition of
“innocence.”
213. See Ross, Richmond Narratives, supra note 5, at 409-10 (discussing how judicial
opinion-writers can deceive the reader by “obscuring the notion of choice that is at the
heart of their work”).
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The Sopranos metaphor suggests an alternative approach to
the question of how courts  should take account of “innocent”
workers when remedying injuries inflicted on the victims of discrim-
ination.  Remedies for employers’ discrimination and societal dis-
crimination should begin with the premise that the ill-gotten gains
of discrimination should be returned to the victims of discrimina-
tion.  This essay does not purport to answer every possible legiti-
mate critique of this “return all ill-gotten gains” principle.  Rather,
it is a device which serves principally to remind us that the pur-
ported “innocence” of third parties is neither an inevitable starting
place for discussions about just remedies for workplace discrimina-
tion nor an appropriate ending point.  The “return all ill-gotten
gains” principle offers an opportunity to think anew about reme-
dies for workplace discrimination from a perspective that takes the
interests of discrimination victims at least as seriously as the inter-
ests of their co-workers.
These battling metaphors directly suggest lessons about how
workplace discrimination remedies cases, constitutional affirmative
action cases, and Title VII affirmative action cases should be de-
cided.  But they also indirectly raise difficult questions about the
use of language and metaphor in legal decisions.214  In part, anti-
discrimination statutes and constitutional provisions seek to eradi-
cate the harmful consequences of passions, both conscious and un-
conscious, born of prejudice.  One means to this end is to require
employers to replace discriminatory choices with rational decision-
making rooted in facts and evidence.  To the extent that the
Court’s invocation of “innocence” excites our passions or elicits vis-
ceral rather than reasoned responses, it undermines this central
purpose of anti-discrimination law.  “Innocence,” as it has been mis-
used in the workplace discrimination cases, exploits our elemental
instinct to protect the most vulnerable while preventing us from
pausing to consider whether the object of our concern actually
needs or deserves protection and whether someone else, equally
vulnerable and actually victimized, holds a better claim to care and
214. This essay makes no generalized claims about the proper uses of metaphor in
the law, although there is a good deal to be said about this subject. See, e.g., Ross,
Rhetorical Tapestry, supra note 4, at 40 (proposing edifying narrative as a remedy for
obfuscatory metaphor).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-2\NLR202.txt unknown Seq: 72 14-MAR-05 17:51
648 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
protection.  Thus, “innocence” distracts us from the reasoning
function that our policy goals hold should lie at the core of judicial
decision-making and, in the workplace discrimination realm, em-
ployers’ decision-making.  As a result, one important antidote to
workplace discrimination — rationality — is frustrated by
“innocence.”
This essay seems to suggest that the remedy for this malady is
the “hair of the dog”; that is, remedying the ill-effects of one evoca-
tive phrase and its metaphorical exemplar with a different meta-
phor which evokes different images and emotions.  But this essay
illustrates the great difficulty with using a metaphor to explain or
justify legal points.  The Sopranos metaphor required several varia-
tions to permit a full consideration of many of the complex issues
raised by these cases, and even these variations do not add up to a
global or thorough solution to all of the problems that might be
identified.  Thus, the cure risks bearing some resemblance to the
disease.
There is a risk that replacing one evocative phrase or metaphor
with another merely replaces one set of irrational prejudices or in-
complete judgments with another, in the worst case, or incomplete
consideration of the issues, in a better case.  In either case, the
threat to accomplishing the goals of our nation’s anti-discrimina-
tion laws remains.  But if a confrontation over language and meta-
phors results in full disclosure of the policy choices underlying
judicial decision making and greater insight into the appropriate
choices, then this endeavor is well worth the effort, in spite of the
attending risks.
